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Aquaculture production of oysters has occurred in the state of Maryland since 
the 1890s, with limited success due to restrictive regulations and opposition from the 
commercial wild industry.  After revision of the aquaculture leasing regulations in 
2009, the Maryland oyster aquaculture industry expanded more than 10-fold.  In 
2010, Maryland Agricultural Resource Based Industry Development Corporation 
(MARBIDCO) started the Maryland Shellfish Aquaculture Loan fund, which features 
an interest-only period and partial-principle forgiveness.  Loans taken through this 
 
program typically have a 3%, three-year, interest only period.  If all interest only 
payments are made on time 40% of principle of the first loan is forgiven.  Remaining 
principle is amortized at a rate of 5% over the remaining term of the loan.  Any 
subsequent loans feature the same interest only period, however only 25% of the loan 
principle is forgiven.  This study evaluated if there is any difference in farm 
accounting metrics when comparing self-financed operations, conventionally funded 
operations, and operations with MARBIDCO funding on water-column and bottom-
culture oyster aquaculture operations.  Bottom-culture and water-column operations 
had significantly higher net present value (NPV), internal rates of return (IRR), and 
accounting profit values when they were MARBIDCO-financed compared other 
sources of capital.  Significant economies of scale were found in both bottom-culture 
and water-column operations, with larger operations having lower break-even costs.  
The effect of receiving payments for nutrient credits was evaluated for effects on 
farm accounting metrics.  Operations that received nutrient payments had higher 
NPV, and IRR values, and accounting profit than those operations that did not receive 
nutrient payments.  Nutrient credit payments, however, were unlikely to contribute 
substantially to operational success since they represent a small percentage of overall 
revenue.  Successful operations were generally successful without nutrient credit 
payments; therefore, the decision to start an oyster-aquaculture operation should not 
be based on receiving nutrient credit payments.  This research suggests oyster 
aquaculture operations that use MARBIDCO financing in the State of Maryland will 
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Chapter 1: Background 
Introduction 
The state of Maryland has a long history of harvesting seafood from the 
Chesapeake Bay.  One of the primary species harvested has been the Eastern Oyster 
(Crassostrea virginica).  Harvesting reached its peak in the late 1800s and declined 
rapidly since (Figure 1; NOAA, n.d.).  Through overharvesting and disease, wild-oyster 
harvests from the Maryland portion of the Chesapeake Bay have continued to decline to a 
fraction of those historic harvests (Kennedy et al., 2011; Kingsley-Smith et al., 2009; 
Webster, 2009; Paynter and Burreson, 1991).  Aquaculture of oysters has also been 
practiced in the Chesapeake Bay since the 1890s, however, due to restrictive regulations 
and opposition from Maryland commercial watermen, aquaculture did not prosper in 
Maryland (Webster, 2009). 
There has been an increase in Maryland oyster aquaculture since oyster 
aquaculture regulations for the state of Maryland were rewritten in 2009 (Maryland 
Deptartment of Natural Resources, 2017; Wheeler, 2009).  At the same time, Maryland 
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) applied to the National Marine Fisheries 
Service to declare a disaster in the blue crab fishery and was awarded $15 million.  While 
some of the disaster funds were used to buy back crab fishing licenses, $4,237,360 was 
transferred to the Maryland Agriculture and Resource Based Industry Development 
Corporation (MARBIDCO) to provide impact financing for oyster aquaculture to 
promote alternative income streams for affected watermen (Holzer et al., 2017).  




businesses obtain capital needed to start their operations (Maryland Department of 
Agriculture, 2010a).   
Figure 1.  Historic commercially harvested reported oyster landings in the Chesapeake Bay.  (NOAA, n.d.) 
Coupled with the decreased in the number of oyster in the Chesapeake Bay, the 
increases in population and industry in the watershed led to a degradation in the water 
quality of the Chesapeake Bay.  In 2010, to address concerns of water-quality 
degradation, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) established 
the Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) requirements limiting inputs 
of nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment, in order to restore clean water to the Chesapeake 
Bay and its watershed (United State Environmental Protection Agency, 2017).  At the 
same time, an increased interest in the ability of oysters to remove nutrients from the 
water column through normal feeding processes led many to believe oyster aquaculture 
could contribute toward helping Maryland accomplish its required TMDL goals (Bricker 
et al., 2014;  Kellogg et al., 2014; Rose et al., 2014a).  Maryland established a nutrient-




regulations from trades in 2018 (COMAR 26.08.11) without success (Jones et al., 2017).  
While considered promising, oyster aquaculture operations were not able to participate in 
the program (Jones et al., 2010) since nutrients removed by oysters had not been 
evaluated and approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Chesapeake Bay 
Program.   
To evaluate the potential for oyster industry or restoration to generate nutrient 
credits, the Oyster Recovery Partnership (ORP), a non-profit organization, formed an 
expert panel with the EPA Chesapeake Bay Program (Chesapeake Bay Program Water 
Quality Goal Implementation Team, 2015) to evaluate net nutrient removal of 
aquacultured or oyster restoration to be classified as a  Best Management Practice (BMP) 
within the Chesapeake Bay Partnership.  Once a practice is approved by the EPA as a 
BMP, nutrient reduction generated by the BMP may be credited toward achieving 
required TMDL goals.  Aquaculture production has now been approved as a BMP, a first 
step in enabling producers to sell nutrient credits and generate income from those sales. 
Oysters and Aquaculture in Chesapeake Bay Maryland 
Oyster harvesting has occurred in the Chesapeake Bay since before Maryland was 
founded; as oysters were an integral part of Native American diets and were a food 
source for early colonists (MacKenzie Jr., 1996; Ingersoll, 1881).  As the population of 
the United States grew, so did the amount of oysters harvested from the Chesapeake Bay.  
When oysters were known to have reached their peak population densities in the late 
1800s, it is estimated they were so plentiful they could filter the entire water column of 
the Chesapeake Bay every three to six days in the summer, compared with requiring over 




represented navigational hazards (Newell, 1988; Kennedy and Breisch, 1983).  As the 
country’s population expanded, oysters were considered a working class street food (De 
Voe, 1862).  Harvests reached their peak in the late 1800s (Figure 1) before the wild 
fishery began to collapse (NOAA, n.d.).  At their peak, oysters harvest were shipped from 
Baltimore inland at a rate of 30-40 full train-cars per day (Ingersoll, 1881).  Due to this 
intense harvest pressure, the fishery began to collapse (Rothschild et al., 1994; Paynter 
and Burreson, 1991).  Later, introduction of disease due to moving shell and oysters from 
infected areas into other areas around the Chesapeake Bay for shell repletion efforts, 
further decreased the wild-oyster population (Carnegie and Burreson, 2011; Newell, 
1988).  During the 1985-86 harvest season, 1.5 million bushels of oysters were reported 
harvested, which dropped to 383,534 bushels during the 2015-16 season (Tarnowski, 
2017).   
Since its beginning in the 19th Century, Maryland aquaculturists have faced many 
challenges that prevented efforts from becoming a successful industry, which ranged 
from theft to laws prohibiting aquaculture in certain areas due to pressure from 
commercial fishermen who assumed there was a competitive conflict with wild 
harvesting (Webster, 2009; Wieland, 2007).  Despite these challenges, interest in 
aquaculture persisted in Maryland due to the success of aquaculture in other east coast 
states including Virginia.   
In 2009, oyster-leasing laws were amended at the state level to make the business 
of aquaculture easier to start.  Leasing laws were reformed and a “use it or lose it” clause 
was implemented to prevent leases from being acquired but not used (Maryland 




process was streamlined and consolidated into the MDNR (Maryland Department of 
Natural Resources, 2016), thus creating a “one stop shop” for acquiring oyster-
aquaculture leases.  The regulatory changes led to a greater than 10-fold increase in the 
harvest of aquacultured oysters from 2012-2017 (Figure 2; Maryland Aquaculture 
Coordinating Council, 2018).  The increase in shellfish aquaculture in Maryland is 
aligned directly with the United States Department of Commerce Aquaculture Policy, 
National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Aquaculture Policy and the 
National Shellfish Initiative (National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2011b, 
2011a; US Dept. of Commerce, 2011). 
 
Figure 2.  Total Reported Maryland Oyster Aquaculture Harvest 2012-2017 (Maryland Aquaculture 
Coordinating Council, 2018). 
In addition to regulatory challenges, the success of oyster aquaculture in 
Maryland also faces environmental challenges.  The ideal salinity range of Eastern 

























ranges from 18 ppt in the southern areas of the state to less than 5 ppt  in the northern 
portions of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries (Schubel and Pritchard, 1986; 
Chesapeake Bay Program, n.d.).  While not a detriment to the oysters themselves, many 
areas are closed or only conditionally open for harvest for human consumption due to the 
likelihood of pathogens that could be harmful to human health (Maryland Department of 
the Environment, n.d.).  There are also the challenges of oyster diseases in Maryland 
influenced by environmental conditions such as temperature and salinity (Ewart and 
Ford, 1993).  For example, in the 1980s, drought conditions over multiple years increased 
the prevalence of Haplosporidium nelsoni (MSX) and Perkinsus marinus (dermo) that 
decreased oyster production in the Chesapeake Bay (Burreson and Andrews, 1988).  In 
addition, there exist restrictions in specific growing areas in order to protect submerged 
aquatic vegetation (SAV) (Maryland Department of Natural Resources, n.d.).   
 The most common form of oyster aquaculture in Maryland is spat-on-shell 
bottom-culture leases, which represents 80% of current leased areas (Maryland 
Department of Natural Resources, 2018).  A major challenge to starting a bottom-culture 
operation is finding a location with suitable bottom conditions.  If the bottom has too 
much mud, the oysters will sink and suffocate.  In addition, the bottom may not be 
consistent resulting in a “Swiss cheese” effect where an individual may have a one-acre 
lease with pockets of unusable bottom (Parker et al., 2013).  Many aquaculturists will 
purchase additional oyster shell or other material in order to stabilize the bottom to 
alleviate the issue of mud on their lease, but this can be cost-prohibitive depending on the 
volume of material needed and the stabilization material chosen (Webster and Meritt, 




bottom quality; however, many water-column producers use cages, which sit on legs on 
the bottom of the leases.  If the depth of the mud in these operations is too deep, the 
oysters will not survive, or the cages will sink into the mud and become stuck on the 
bottom.   
Despite the regulatory and environmental challenges to oyster aquaculture in 
Maryland, there is still a considerable interest in starting and expanding current oyster 
aquaculture operations as indicated by MDNR reports of the 80-100 lease applications 
under review at any given time over the last several years (Maryland Deptartment of 
Natural Resources, 2018).  The MDNR has developed an Aquaculture Siting Tool to 
assist interested persons determine where to site their oyster aquaculture operation 
(Maryland Department of Natural Resources, n.d.).  The GIS-based web tool has layers 
for bottom type, submerged aquatic vegetation locations, current leases, commercial-
fishing nets, and other prohibited areas and results in illustration of areas that are suitable 
and available for leases.   
Determining the maximum potential for the aquaculture industry in Maryland has 
been difficult.  Carlozo (2014), using GIS analysis, identified priority areas for oyster 
aquaculture in Maryland of 38,018 acres for bottom-culture, 88,973 acres for bottom-
cage culture, and 313,678 acres for floating cage.  In May 2018, there were 6,420 acres of 
bottom leases and 382 acres of water-column leases reported by MDNR (Maryland 
Department of Natural Resources, 2018).  Current leased acreage represents less than an 
estimated 20% of available space for bottom-culture and less than 1% for water-column 
culture is being utilized, and suggests there is room for increased production in the 




Weber et al. (2018) determined available space for aquaculture operations would not be a 
limiting factor over the next 15 years. 
Oyster Aquaculture Industry Expansion in Maryland since 2010 
The Maryland oyster aquaculture industry started to expand in 2010 with the 
signing of the Code of Maryland Regulation 08.02.23.00 in 2009.  The regulation revised 
shellfish aquaculture leasing laws making it easier to obtain an aquaculture lease for 
shellfish production.  Additionally, MDNR began taking applications for submerged-land 
leases and water-column leases.  Further, permitting was streamlined in 2011 into a “one-
stop shop” located in the MDNR Aquaculture Division.   
In January 2014, there were 277 bottom-culture leases representing 3,483 acres 
and 51 water-column leases representing 191 acres of production (Maryland Aquaculture 
Coordinating Council, 2013).  By May 2018, the number of bottom-culture leases had 
increased to 345 representing 6,420 acres and water-column leases had increased to 75 
representing 382 acres of production (Maryland Department of Natural Resources, 2018).  
Along with increased number of leases and acres under production, harvest from 
aquaculture also increased.  In 2012, there were 1,922 bushels harvested from bottom-
culture leases and 1,417 bushels harvested from water-column leases (Maryland 
Aquaculture Coordinating Council, 2018).  In 2017, aquaculture harvest had increased to 
44,805 bushels for bottom-culture and 29,261 bushels for water-column production 
(Figure 3) (Maryland Aquaculture Coordinating Council, 2018).  The rapid production 
increase in the Maryland oyster aquaculture industry is indicative of an early growth 
stage (Porter, 1980), which is further supported by the continued submission of 




September 2010 and January 2018 the state received 502 lease applications and issued 
253 new commercial shellfish aquaculture leases totaling about 5,464 acres (Maryland 
Department of Natural Resources, 2018).  Additionally there are 137 new lease 
applications currently being reviewed (Maryland Department of Natural Resources, 
2018). 
Figure 3.  Reported bottom-culture and water-column oyster aquaculture harvests 2012-2017 (Maryland 
Aquaculture Coordinating Council, 2018). 
Bottom-Culture Production of Oysters in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
In Maryland, the most common form of oyster aquaculture is the culture of spat-
on-shell oysters on bottom leases, which represents 80% of current leased areas in the 
state (Maryland Department of Natural Resources, 2018).  In 2017 there were 393 leases 
in operation, totaling 6,186 acres (Maryland Deptartment of Natural Resources, 2017).  
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bushels to 44,805 bushels (Figure 3) due to the increase in bottom leases from 166 to 327 
during the same period.   
Getting started in the bottom-culture production of oysters has low capital 
investment requirements.  Additionally, those who have previously harvested wild 
oysters, or other commercial fish or shellfish, already have much of the required 
equipment needed for oyster aquaculture, with a boat being the single largest investment.  
Further, those with bottom-culture leases do not have to buy cages because spat-on-shell 
oysters are planted directly on leased bottom. 
Monthly harvest data collected by MDNR since mid-2012 through 2017 shows 
bottom-culture oysters are, primarily harvested from March to October when the wild-
oyster harvest season is closed (Figure 4).  The seasonal difference provides evidence that 
aquaculture does not compete with the wild-oyster harvest.   
The per-bushel price for oysters harvested from bottom-culture operations has 
ranged from $50-$65 in recent years.  In comparison,  the average 2017 per-bushel price 
for the wild-oyster fishery was $47 (Tarnowski, 2018) up from approximately $32 per 
bushel in 2013 (Tarnowski, 2013).  The price differential, combined with the timing of 
reported aquaculture harvests, provides good evidence that many growers are taking 
advantage of higher prices during the summer.   
The MDNR had received applications with 287 Tidal Fisheries License (TFL) 
holders named on lease applications between 2010 and 2016 (Maryland Deptartment of 
Natural Resources, 2017).  This increase is important because the number of TFL holders 




the economic potential of farming oysters as a means to supplement their income 
(Maryland Aquaculture Coordinating Council, 2018).    
 
Figure 4.  Reported monthly harvest of oysters from bottom-culture operations in Maryland, Chesapeake 
Bay from 2012-2017 (MDNR, 2018). 
The majority of bottom-culture oysters are harvested and sold to restaurants and 
shucking houses for the oyster-meat market (Maryland Aquaculture Coordinating 
Council, 2018).  However, there may be a harvest portion that is suitable for the half-shell 
market.  Although this latter harvest portion is not known, it could be as high as 25% of 
production based on information from growers and industry experts.  The half-shell 
market would require the producer to sort, clean, and market single oysters to 
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Water Column Production of oysters in Maryland 
While water-column oyster aquaculture is not as prevalent in Maryland as 
bottom-culture (Maryland Deptartment of Natural Resources, 2017), it has grown in acres 
and production since leasing laws were revised in 2009.  From 2012 to 2017, aquaculture 
production from water-column aquaculture increased from 1,922 bushels in 2012 to 
29,261 bushels in 2017 (Figure 3) due to the increase in water-column leases from 20 to 
75 during the same time period (Maryland Aquaculture Coordinating Council, 2013, 
2018). In 2017 there were 92 leases in operation totaling 191 acres (Maryland 
Aquaculture Coordinating Council, 2018).   
While oyster harvest from bottom-culture operations tends to be when the wild 
oyster season is closed, data from MDNR indicates harvest of aquaculture oysters from 
water-column operations occurs year round (Figure 5) without any noticeable trends.  
Industry participants have speculated that drops in reported production from month-to-
month may be due to a lack of inventory from some farms, as sales rebound when 
market-size product becomes available. 
Most of the oysters produced in water-column operations are single oysters for the 
half-shell market (Maryland Aquaculture Coordinating Council, 2018).  The oysters 
produced for this market command a higher market price than those produced utilizing 
bottom-culture methods, which has drawn many growers to produce oysters using water-
column methods, despite the higher capital requirements when compared to bottom-
culture.  Higher capital costs are attributed to the equipment needed to produce market 
size oysters on a water-column lease.  In Maryland, the “Virginia style” bottom cages 




utilizing various configurations of floating gear or small Australian long-line style cages 
(Figure 7; Webster and Meritt, 2013).  Cages vary in price based on the style, 
manufacturer and where they are purchased.  As production increases, more cages are 
needed for the operation.  Additionally a boat outfitted with a hoist is often required to 
remove cages from the water to process and harvest oysters.  Some growers also purchase 
additional equipment such as tumblers, graders, and shell washers resulting in higher 
capital costs.  
Figure 5.  Reported montly harvest of oysters from water-column operations in the Maryland Chesapeake 
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Figure 7.  Example of Australian Longline Oyster Aquaculture System.  (Photo Credit- Hoopers Island 
Oyster Company) 
Figure 6.  Typical double-stack oyster bottom cages used in water-column oyster production in Maryland 




Ecosystem Services Provided by Oysters 
Coupled to the economic benefits derived from increased oyster production in 
Maryland as a food source is the fact oysters are widely recognized for their filtering 
capacity and associated environmental benefits (Cornwell et al., 2016; Testa et al., 2015; 
Rose et al., 2014b, 2014a; Kellogg et al., 2014; 2013; Fulford et al., 2010; North et al., 
2010; Kemp et al., 2005; Newell et al., 2005; Newell, 1988).  The environmental benefit, 
or ecosystem service, is effected by oysters removing nutrients from the water in the form 
of nitrogen and phosphorus through normal filter-feeding activity (Cornwell et al., 2016).  
Oysters feed on phytoplankton and detritus and through digestion, nutrients are used for 
growth of tissue and shell development (Newell, 1988).  Excess nitrogen and phosphorus 
in the water-column are known to contribute to eutrophication problems in the Bay and 
any mitigation of their impact on water quality is a significant ecological advantage 
(Newell et al., 2005b).   
Seeing the need for more tools to help improve the health of the Chesapeake Bay, 
the Oyster Recovery Partnership (ORP), under the direction of the EPA Chesapeake Bay 
Program, formed an expert panel to develop a set of oyster-related BMP’s and estimate 
nutrient-credit reduction effectiveness attributed to oysters in the Bay.  Panel membership 
was approved by the Water Quality Goal Implementation Team (WQGIT) in 2015 
(Chesapeake Bay Program Water Quality Goal Implementation Team, 2015).  The panel 
evaluated oyster data from various studies to determine the amounts of nitrogen and 
phosphorus in oysters to calculate a nutrient reduction effectiveness (Wiedenhoft, 2017; 
Cornwell et al., 2016). The reported amount of nitrogen and phosphorus in oyster tissue 




and phosphorus removed in the meat of aquacultured oysters was quantified by a USEPA 
Expert Panel1 (Table 1; Cornwell et al., 2016). The average percentage amount of 
nitrogen by dry weight of oyster tissue was reported to be 8.22 ± 0.89% SD and reported 
amounts of nitrogen in shell ranges from 0.19% to 0.21% (Kellogg et al., 2013).  The 
Panel’s initial recommendations were approved by the Chesapeake Bay WQGIT in 
December 2016 resulting in an approved BMP for nutrient removal attributed to oyster 
aquaculture  (Davis-Martin et al., 2016).  Logically, increasing the numbers of oysters in 
the Bay through aquaculture will increase the overall filtering capacity of the total oyster 
population and increase the amount of nitrogen and phosphorus assimilated into oyster 
tissue and shell.  Overall, when compared to other BMP’s, oysters are equally if not more 
efficient than those practices approved for use in the Chesapeake Bay (Rose et al., 
2014a).   
In addition to the nitrogen and phosphorus directly assimilated into oyster tissue 
and shell, it is possible for there to be an increase in denitrification associated with 
restored oyster reefs (Sisson et al., 2011).  Increased denitrification was not associated 
with intensive water-column aquaculture operations as described by Kellogg et al.  
(2014), however, a study in Rhode Island showed oyster aquaculture in bottom cages had 
comparable denitrification rates to restored oyster reefs in the area (Humphries et al., 
2016).  Other research suggests if one considers more than just the footprint of the 
aquaculture farm (leased bottom), there could be a net benefit of denitrification due to 
                                                 
1 The USA EPA Expert Panel plans to research and make recommendations for nutrients removed via the 





aquaculture on a site-specific basis (Testa et al., 2015).  While some studies have shown 
there could be some localized negative effects due to shellfish aquaculture (Burkholder 
and Shumway, 2011), this research warrants further consideration of the value of site-
specific denitrification associated with aquaculture.   
Table 1.  Default estimates of nutrient reduction effectiveness from aquaculture oyster tissue approved by 













Content in Oyster Tissue (g/oyster) 
Diploid             Triploid 
Nitrogen Phosphorus Nitrogen Phosphorus 
2.0 - 2.49 2.25 57 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 
2.5 - 3.49 3 76 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.01 
3.5 - 4.49 4 102 0.15 0.02 0.26 0.03 
4.5 - 5.49 5 127 0.22 0.02 0.44 0.05 
≥ 5.5 6 152 0.31 0.03 0.67 0.07 
Eutrophication in Chesapeake Bay 
As mentioned previously, TMDL requirements were imposed by the EPA in the 
Clean Water Act in 2010 to address water quality concerns (33 U.S.C.  §§1251-1387).  
The TMDL is the amount of pollution a water body can receive and still meet water 
quality standards.  The TMDL for Chesapeake Bay was enacted in December 2010 with 
the intention of creating a “pollution diet” and restore clean water to the watershed 
(United State Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.).  The TMDL was designed to 
achieve a nutrient and sediment levels by 2025 that would result in fully restored water 
quality needed for aquatic habitat in the Chesapeake Bay, with 60% of pollution 
reductions to be completed by 2017 (United State Environmental Protection Agency, 
2017).  The TMDL limits for the watershed are set at 185.9 million pounds of nitrogen, 




States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017a).  The 2017 TMDL midpoint assessment 
report was published in June 2018 and stated that Maryland has reached its overall goal 
for phosphorus and sediment reductions, but had not met the goal for nitrogen reductions 
(Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 2018).   
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and University of Maryland Center for 
Environmental Sciences (UMCES) have been issuing reports grading the health of the 
Chesapeake Bay since 1998.  Both reports indicate the health of the Bay has been 
improving; however, grades have ranged from “C” to “E” depending on which water 
quality parameter was measured and the locality (Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 2016; 
University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, 2016).  Even though 
dissolved oxygen and phosphorus levels have improved, overall the Bay water quality 
has held steady with no significant change over time from 1986 to 2016 (Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation, 2016).  Some experts feel the grades from these reports may worsen in the 
future due to an increase in sedimentation in the Bay as the Conowingo Reservoir’s 
trapping efficiency diminishes (Zhang and Blomquist, 2018; Zhang et al., 2016).  With 
BMP approval, nitrogen and phosphorus removed via oyster tissue harvested from 
aquaculture operations in the Bay can be credited toward the TMDL.  This action is an 
important first step toward any potential financial compensation to Chesapeake Bay 
oyster farmers for the nutrient removal, also known as ecosystem services, by the oysters 
on their farms.  Financial compensation could come from selling nutrient credits in an 
established market place or by policy changes designed to help expand the Maryland 
aquaculture industry.  This study assumed payments were based on transaction in a 




Impact Investment Financing 
Impact investing can be described as an investment that intends to generate a 
social or environmental good along with financial returns (Clarkin and Cangioni, 2016; 
Bocken, 2015; Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011; Bugg-Levine and Goldstein, 2009).  
Early adopters of impact financing have been philanthropists, charitable foundations, and 
other organizations or individuals.  Lately, investors have begun to raise concerns as to 
the practicality of impact investments.  Broadly stated, the challenges associated with 
impact financing have revolved around complying with statutory and general laws, 
including impact financing in modern portfolios, developing the appropriate 
infrastructure, the sustainability of investments, and finding individuals or firms with the 
expertise to manage the investments (Ormiston et al., 2015). These concerns echo 
sentiments expressed by Bugg-Levine and Goldstein (2009) when they described 
challenges that must be addressed such as creating standards, developing markets, and 
supportive policy reform.  Bolstering these concerns is the scarcity of published studies 
on impact investment (Clarkin and Cangioni, 2016; Ormiston et al., 2015).  However, 
there still appears to be a sizable amount of activity in impact investing in the form of 
microfinance loans around the world (Saeed, 2014). Impact investing has been mostly 
limited to developing countries until the financial crisis of 2008.  The establishment of 
the Grameen America Bank in 2008, along with provision of microcredit to small famers 
through the Farm Service Agency (FSA), and the development of organizations like 
MARBIDCO, impact investing has been expanding in recent years (Saeed, 2014; Srnec et 




Typically, when someone wants to start an aquaculture operation, there are two 
primary sources of capital available to start the operation.  One is to self-finance the 
operation through personal savings or investments.  The other is to use debt financing 
through a lending source such as FSA, the Farm Credit System, Bank of America, or 
Wells Fargo.  FSA loans are often aimed at small and beginning farmers who do not 
qualify for credential lending and are used for land, livestock, seed, and other farming 
inputs (Srnec et al., 2009).  Much like the FSA, MARBIDCO makes loans of various 
sizes to agricultural entities in the state of Maryland.  For example, MARBIDCO has 
developed a specialty-lending program in collaboration with MDNR to help expand the 
Maryland shellfish-aquaculture industry.  A key characteristic of this specialty loan is an 
interest-only period and partial forgiveness of the loan principle, if all interest only 
payments are made on time (Maryland Agricultural Based Industry Development 
Corporation, 2017).  The MARBIDCO has approved over 50 shellfish aquaculture loans 
in its program since 2011 totaling over $3 million (Maryland Agricultural Based Industry 
Development, n.d.); however, there have been no attempts to assess the impact of the 
loan fund on farm-level profitability.  Anecdotally, and motivations for this study, the 
author has seen first-hand instances where it appears that certain size farms with low 
levels of predicted production may be financially better off using personal funds for 
starting an aquaculture business, rather than participate in the MARBIDCO program.  
This assessment is due to the MARBIDCO loan structure where the remaining principle 
is amortized over a two-year period, which results in exceedingly large loan payments 




An alternate form of impact investing is the development of environmental or 
green bonds.  While most impact investment has been in the form of Social Impact 
Bonds, there has been less investment in the environmental side of the sector (Nicola, 
2013).  Green bonds began to emerge in 2007 and have grown tremendously with issuers 
such as the World Bank (Carolyn et al., 2015).  In 2016, the District of Columbia Water 
and Sewer Authority, in partnership with Goldman Sachs Urban Investment Group and 
Calvert Foundation, issued an environmental impact bond at a 30-year, tax exempt, $25 
million face value to finance storm-water management improvements (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2017b).    
Nicola (2013) noted water quality trading programs can be considered as an 
impact investment tool and could be bolstered by the establishment of an environmental 
impact bond (EIB).  He further describes an EIB as a “pay-for-performance” contract to 
address an environmental issue, which represents a “monetization of future costs savings.  
The EIB establishes a fund where investors are paid a return-for-cost savings generated 
by a project.  However, if such a system were functioning properly, an EIB is not needed 
(Nicola, 2013).  In 2010, Maryland developed a water-quality trading tool as a way to 
help meet its TMDL goals (Maryland Department of Agriculture, 2010b).  As of 2017, 
there have not been any successful trades from this marketplace due to the lack of market 
demand (Jones et al., 2017).  With this lack of a successful trading system, it seems the 
Maryland portion of the Chesapeake Bay would be a likely candidate for the 
implementation of an EIB to help facilitate a marketplace where oyster aquaculture 





As wild-oyster harvests in Maryland are predicted to decline and oyster 
aquaculture continues to grow, a clear need has emerged to evaluate the impact 
MARBIDCO funding will have on the profitability of future oyster farms in Maryland.  
In addition, with the interest in ecosystem services provided by oysters and inclusion of 
oyster aquaculture in Chesapeake Bay TMDL BMP’s, industry has expressed a need to 
evaluate the potential for other forms of impact financing to increase oyster aquaculture 




Chapter 2:  Evaluating the Effects of Different Funding 
Sources on Maryland Oyster Aquaculture Profitability 
 
While aquaculture has been growing in the state of Maryland since the revision of 
leasing laws, there remains an absence of information on the industry in peer-reviewed 
publications, particularly in respect to how different sources of capital relate to farm 
profitability.  The following study examined the potential profitability of bottom-culture, 
spat-on-shell oyster operations and water-column oyster operations in Maryland over a 
10-year period, and evaluates the differences when the operation is 1) self-financed 2) 
financed by MARBIDCO, and 3) funded by conventional lending sources.  In addition, 
each financing scenario was evaluated with and without compensation for ecosystems 
services rendered in the form of nutrient-removal payments.  Due to the length of time it 
takes oysters to reach market size, and the resulting lack of revenue in the first few years 
of an operation, a 10-year period was chosen due to allow multiple crops to be produced 
during the study simulation. 
When possible, public agency reports were used to develop the summary of the 
bottom-culture and water-column culture portions of the Maryland aquaculture industry.  
Unless otherwise noted, industry information described within was gathered through 
informal interviews and discussions with state agency personnel, industry experts, owners 
of active aquaculture operations, the author’s experiences working in the industry, and 
attendees from University of Maryland Extension Aquaculture Workshops.  Where 
possible, model assumptions were developed using published, peer-reviewed data.  Due 




developed though informal interviews, discussion with industry experts, active industry 
producers, participants in University of Maryland Extension Aquaculture Workshops, 
and the author’s personal experience.2 
Materials and Methods 
In order to compare the effects of different financing options and payments for 
nutrient removal on oyster-operation profitability, capital-budgeting analyses published 
by University of Maryland Extension (Parker et al., 2013, 2015) were modified for use in 
this study in order to account for different sources of capital used to start and operate the 
oyster aquaculture farms.  Specifically, bottom-culture analysis was modified to allow 
production to be driven by the bottom-culture lease size rather than production values due 
to how aquaculture operations are described by industry members.  Modifications to 
water-column production analysis included the ability to estimate harvests during 
operation start up and estimates of labor were based on production levels for water-
column oyster culture.  The water-column production analysis was also modified to base 
production on the number of individual oysters to be harvested once a farm reached full 
production due to how farms are described by industry members. 
A section for three financing options 1) self-financed, 2) financed by 
MARBIDCO, and 3) financed by conventional-lending sources were added to each 
budget.  The financing modifications allowed up to three loans from MARBIDCO with 
                                                 
2 Personal communications: Karl Roscher, Maryland Department of Natural Resources; Don Webster, 
University of Maryland Extension; Don Meritt, University of Maryland Center for Environmental Sciences; 
Eric Wisner, Eric Wisner Oysters; JD Blackwell, 38 Degrees North Oyster Company; Scott Budden, 
Orchard Point Oyster Company; Ted Cooney, Madhouse Oyster Company; Bill Cox, Honga Oyster 
Company; Steve Vilnit, Capital Seaboard; Jason Ruth, W.H.  Harris Company; Mike McWilliams, Captain 




financing terms of an interest-only period and partial principle forgiveness corresponding 
to the MARBIDCO loan fund options.  For comparison, three loans from conventional 
financing agencies without the interest-only period or partial principle-forgiveness terms 
were included.   
Due to the interest in nutrient removals provided by oysters aquaculture, a 
calculation of nitrogen and phosphorus reduction efficiencies was included in the 
modified capital budgeting analysis based on the BMP recommendations adopted by the 
Chesapeake Bay Program in 2016 for oyster-tissue harvested from aquaculture operations 
(Cornwell et al., 2016).  A variable for different payment rates for nitrogen and 
phosphorus removal was also included.   
Annual cash-flow statements and ten-year enterprise budgets were incorporated 
into the capital budgeting analysis for each source of financing with and without nutrient 
payments for each production system budget.  The cash-flow statements and enterprise 
budgets were constructed so that all inputs would be the same for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments.  Each simulation yielded six unique data sets to 
afford comparisons between funding sources with and without nutrient payments.   
Simulations of the effects of different funding sources over a ten year period were 
performed using the @Risk version 7.6 (Palisade Corporation, 2018) Microsoft Excel 
add-in.  Each simulation utilized Monte Carlo sampling techniques and with 5,000 
iterations.  Statistical analysis was performed using the StatTools version 7.6 add-in that 





The model is a spreadsheet workbook, containing annual cash flow calculations 
and enterprise budgets, which estimate average profits per firm using estimated input 
costs and expected production.  Enterprise budgeting and annual cash flow predictions 
are commonly used when evaluating aquaculture practices since aquaculture is still a 
relatively new enterprise in the Western hemisphere (Engle, 2010).  Information and data 
to create the model were gathered from peer-reviewed literature and industry 
representatives.  Monte Carlo simulation was used to input a range of cost and production 
estimates on business performance over a ten-year period based on constructed risk 
distributions.  Yearly accounting profit, ten-year net present value (NPV), ten-year 
internal rate of return (IRR), and the payback period were calculated for each annual 
iteration of the model.  Annual enterprise budgets, representing annualized costs of inputs 
and value of the outputs, were developed to calculate the total costs and revenue over a 
ten-year period.  Annual enterprise budgets were then summed to create a ten-year 
enterprise budget for each source of financing with and without nutrient credit payments.  
A ten-year period was chosen to evaluate profitability due to the length of time it takes to 
grow oysters to market size for each production method, allowing multiple crops to be 
produced to better estimate farm profitability metrics in the Maryland portion of the 
Chesapeake Bay that is conducive to oyster aquaculture. 
Common model assumptions for bottom-culture and water-column culture 
operations. 
Although separate models for bottom-culture and water-column culture methods 




operations, and are presented in Table 2.  Assumptions specific to a given production 
method are discussed later in individual sections.  Production and analysis are discussed 
in terms of bushels for bottom-culture operations and single oysters for water-column 
aquaculture due to the prevalence of that terminology in the industry.   
An estimate of 275, 3-inch market size, oysters per bushel (Meritt and Webster, 
2014a) was used to convert single oyster production to bushel equivalents and vice versa.   
Retail containers for oyster produced for the half-shell market are assumed plain 
100-count waxed boxes based on their prevalence in the Maryland industry.  According 
to industry experts, basic retail boxes are assumed to cost $1.00 per box.  I assumed no 
customization of retail boxes (logos, colors, brand names, etc.) that would raise the cost 
per box. 
Table 2.  Common model assumptions values used in analysis of profitability calculations for bottom-
culture and water-column oyster production in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Operating Cost Assumptions Value in Model 
Market-Size Oysters Per Bushel 275 (Meritt and Webster, 2014a) 
Retail Containers for Half-Shell Market 100 count box(Parker et al., 2013) 
Cost Of Retail Containers for Half-Shell Market $1.00 per box 
General Labor Rate $12.50 per hour 
Supervisory/Owner Labor Rate $20.00 per hour 
Supervisory/Owner Operator Labor Hours Per Week 40 
Unemployment Insurance Tax 2.6% of payroll 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) 6.2% of payroll 
Workman's Comp 5% of payroll 
General Liability Insurance 
$1,000 per $150,000 in revenue per year 
(Bankers Insurance, 2016) 
Boat Insurance 
$600 per boat per year (Bankers Insurance, 
2016) 
Auto Insurance 
$683 per auto per year (Bankers Insurance, 
2016) 
Repairs and Maintenance 1% of variable costs – employment expenses 





Wage rates were established through a combination of discussions with industry 
participants.  A wage rate estimate of $12.50 per hour for all general labor was used 
based on discussions with attendees at University of Maryland Extension business 
planning workshops in 2016.  A wage of $20.00 per hour is estimated for a supervisor.  If 
a farm supervisor is not employed, this payment rate is assumed to represent owner 
salary.  If a supervisor is employed, the owner’s compensation is assumed the operation 
profit.  Costs associated with employees beyond wages are included in Table 2. 
Business insurance costs for are calculated based on insurance shellfish 
aquaculture industry estimates (Bankers Insurance, 2016).  These rates are $1,000 per 
$150K in sales for general liability insurance, $683 per automobile per year, and $600 per 
boat per year.  Crop insurance is not included since it is generally not available for 
shellfish production.  Operations may choose to participate in the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Non-Insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program 
(NAP), which waives fees for basic coverage for participants who have been in operation 
less than 10 years, and therefore not included in the model. 
Specific assumptions of bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operations 
Specific assumptions about bottom-culture production and costs were made based 
on discussions with current bottom-culture operations in Maryland and regional industry 
experts (Table 3).  Key assumptions included annual-planting rate, overall survival from 
planting to harvest, labor required, and associated costs.  Discussions about the sources of 
the assumptions are included below.  According to MDNR in May 2017, the mean size 
for bottom leases was 18.51 acres, the median was 9.15 acres, and the mode was 5 acres.  




production levels were simulated (5 acres, 10 acres, 20 acres, 100 acres).  Each 
production level was simulated with and without compensation for the ecosystem service 
provision of nitrogen and phosphorus removal from harvested oyster tissue. 
Table 3.  Specific static model assumptions values used in analysis of profitability calculations unique for 
bottom-culture oyster production in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  
Bottom-Culture Operating Cost Assumptions Value in Model 
Percent of lease suitable for planting before bottom 
stabilization 
80% 
% of Lease Harvested Each Year 33% 
Annual Seeding Density 2,000,000 spat per acre (Meritt and Webster, 
2014a) 
Predicted Survival From Planting To Harvest 15%  (Abbe et al., 2010; Kingsley-Smith et 
al., 2009; Congrove, 2008) 
Purchase Price Of Bulk Spat $3.50 per 1000 spat (Horn Point Oyster 
Hatchery, 2018a) 
Percent of oysters reaching market size in year 1 0% (Congrove, 2008) 
Percent of oysters reaching market size in year 2 37%  (Congrove, 2008) 
Percent of oysters reaching market size in year 3 100%  (Congrove, 2008) 
Lease Rent $3.50 per acre 
Supervisory/Owner Operator Labor Weeks Per Year 40 
General Labor Weeks Per Year 35 
 
Bottom condition is an important factor in the siting of shellfish bottom-culture 
leases (Webster and Meritt, 1988).  It is rare to have a lease with 100% of the bottom 
suitable for oyster culture.  Consequentially, spatial patchiness is problematic, difficult to 
determine, and hard to monitor with regard to anticipated total production capability 
(Meritt and Webster, 2014b).  Furthermore, to minimize the amount of oysters that may 
end up outside of the leased areas, a buffer space is often left along the outside edges of 
the lease.  Oysters outside of the leased area may be harvested by others, and reduce 
overall production from the lease.  Therefore, 80% of total bottom space available was 




the approximate locations of the unsuitable areas in their lease and avoid planting seed in 
those areas as best as possible, which is included in this 80% assumption.   
To maximize annual market-size product availability a “crop rotation” method of 
annual seeding of oyster leases was incorporated into the model with one-third of each 
lease harvested annually to account for the 36-month growth-to-harvest size of three 
inches.  After the annual harvest, the area that was harvested was reseeded with spat-on-
shell oysters the following year.  For example, a 5-acre lease with 80% suitable bottom 
will harvest and seed approximately 1.32 acres annually.   
Bottom-culture operations are planted with diploid, spat-on-shell, oyster seed 
annually at an equivalent rate of 2 million spat-on-shell, seed oysters per acre based on 
the upper range reported in Meritt and Webster (2014a).  Diploid oysters are similar to 
wild oysters genetically and are available in bulk from the University of Maryland Center 
for Environmental Science (UMCES), Horn Point Oyster Hatchery.  Spat-on-shell oysters 
are used for bottom-culture to prevent excess mortality on small oysters from crabs, 
cownose rays, and other predators. 
Survival from planting to harvest was estimated at 15%.  This value was 
determined by reviewing information published for the survival of bottom-cultured 
oysters in the Chesapeake Bay (Abbe et al., 2010; Kingsley-Smith et al., 2009; Congrove, 
2008).  Greater weight was given to the values presented by Congrove (2008) because he 
specifically focused on aquaculture objectives more closely related to current practices in 
Maryland.  While Congrove (2008) suggested 20% survival to market size in the state of 




A more conservative 15% was used as a base survival rate in this calculation, due to the 
potential variations between sites and lack of studies in this area.   
As any other live animal crop produced, individual oysters grow at different rates.  
Even though it was assumed it would take an average of 36 months for spat-on-shell 
oysters to reach market size, it is possible some reach market size sooner.  Based on 
information presented by Congrove (2008) none of the oysters planted will reach market 
size in the first year of operation, 37% of oysters will reach market size in the second 
year, and 100% of oysters will reach market size in the third and subsequent years.   
Conversations with industry producers suggested an operation with a vessel 
previously used for wild harvest of oysters could harvest 150 acres per year, per boat.  
Currently, it is an industry practice to contract other individuals using their own fishing 
boats to harvest oysters from bottom leases over 150 acres.  Typically, there are two deck 
hands operating per boat during the harvest.  Thus, a good estimate of labor assumes two 
employees working 40 hours per week for 30 weeks per year.  Harvest records submitted 
to MDNR indicate bottom-culture spat–on-shell oyster harvest occurs only from March 
until October.  Additional harvests occur between Thanksgiving and Christmas because 
of historical seasonal market demand (Figure 4).  Supervisory labor was assumed to be 
40 weeks per year for each operation.  To accommodate the time from start-up to full 
production, general labor was reduced in the first two years of the operation to account 
for the time needed for oysters to reach market size.  Therefore, labor in the first year was 
estimated to be 25% of the calculated amount for a full-production operation.  Labor in 
the second year increased to 50% of the calculated amount.  Full-labor costs are expected 




amount each year.  It is assumed the owner used the time in the first two years of the 
operation to acquire materials, attend educational workshops, and find buyers for the 
oysters produced from the lease. 
Specific assumptions water-column oyster aquaculture operations 
Specific assumptions about water-column production and costs were made based 
on discussion with current oyster operations in Maryland and regional industry experts 
(Table 4).  Key assumptions included overall survival from planting to harvest, labor 
required and associated costs, and the percentage of oysters reaching market size in years 
one and two.  Discussion about the sources of the model assumptions are included below.  
There were four production-level models, based in information from the industry and 
amounts indicated on MARBIDCO loan fund applications (500,000 oysters per year, 1 
million oysters per year, 2 million oysters per year, 2.5 million oysters per year).  Each 
production level was modeled with and without compensation for nitrogen and 
phosphorus removed from harvested oyster tissue.  Specific static model assumptions 
values used in analysis of profitability calculations unique water-column oyster 
production in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
It was assumed that, double-stack “Virginia tray style” cages, measuring 3 feet by 
4 feet, (Figure 6) are deployed containing 1,200 three-inch oysters per cage at harvest.  
The total number of cages required for the farm to reach full production level was 
determined based on this capacity.  Six plastic mesh “bags” are inserted into each cage to 
prevent seed from falling out of cages until oysters reach a size where they will not fall 




Table 4.  Specific static model assumptions values used in analysis of profitability calculations unique 




Value in Model 
Lease Size 5 
Percent of lease harvested 
each year 
50%  
Acres of lease harvested 
each year 
2.5 
Predicted Survival From 
Planting To Harvest 
50% (Proestou et al., 2016; Callam, 2013; Hudson et al., 2012; Paynter et al., 
1992, 2008; Wieland, 2007; Calvo et al., 1999) 
Market Size Oysters Per 
Grow out Container 
1200 (Myron Horzesky, Ketchum Traps, personal communication) 
Percent of oysters harvested 
in first year 
25% 
Percent of oysters harvested 
in second year 
75% 
Percent of oysters harvested 
in years 3+ 
100% 
Percentage of oysters sold to 
half-shell market 
100% 
Sq.  ft.  per container 12 
Number of mesh bags per 
container 
6 
Mesh Bag Cost $6.00 (Ketcham Supply Company, 2018)   
Purchase Price Of Seed $17.00 per 1000(Horn Point Oyster Hatchery, 2018b)  
Lease Rent/acre annual $25.00  
General Labor Hours per 
year 
Based on calculation 




The lease size for all farming operations is assumed five acres.  Based on data 
from MDNR in May of 2017, the mean water-column lease size was 4.69 acres, the 
median lease size as 4.1 acres.  The modal water-column lease size was 5 acres.  The 
number of cages per acre varies in the Maryland industry based on owner preference, 
lease configuration, and production goals.  The theoretical maximum number of cages 
that could be put on a five-acre lease is 18,150 cages based on cages taking up 12 square 




Thus, the five-acre lease size assumption gives ample room for all cages, for all 
production levels analyzed.   
Fifty percent of each lease is harvested per year based on two-year average 
growth to a market size of three inches.  This harvest strategy allows a crop rotation to be 
established to ensure product availability each year once the farm reaches full operating 
capacity.  The stocking of additional seed will occur each year to meet production goals.   
Predicted survival from seed to market size is 50%.  Literature review shows 
oyster survival in containers is highly variable in the Chesapeake Bay with ranges of 8% 
to over 70% mortality (Proestou et al., 2016; Callam, 2013; Hudson et al., 2012; Paynter 
et al., 1992, 2008; Wieland, 2007; Calvo et al., 1999).  Fifty percent mortality was 
selected as a medium level of mortality based on the published data and discussions with 
commercial operations.   
Additionally, some oysters grow faster than others do, which can be due to 
normal variation in individual oysters or driven by site-specific factors such as on local 
oxygen levels, salinity, and food availability.  It is assumed 25% of oysters stocked at 
farm startup were harvested in the first year.  Seventy-five percent of oysters stocked at 
farm startup were harvested in the second year.  The farm will reach steady state of oyster 
harvests in the third and subsequent years. 
Based on consultation with industry and industry experts, currently all oysters 
harvested from water-column operations in the state of Maryland are sold into the half-
shell market. 
Oyster seed is purchased for $17.00 per 1,000 for 5-10 mm triploid, disease-




2018b) based on prevalence in the industry (Maryland Aquaculture Coordinating 
Council, 2018).  Triploid oysters are specially bred to add an additional set of 
chromosomes, which prevents them from reproducing.  Since the triploid oysters do not 
produce reproductive organs, all energy is devoted to growth resulting in better meat 
quality year round.  Many producers also feel triploid oysters grow faster than diploid 
oysters based on published data (Maryland Aquaculture Coordinating Council, 2018; 
Dégremont et al., 2012). 
A formula (Equation 1) for general labor was calculated based on regression 
analysis (Figure 8) of data available from Virginia operations (Hudson et al., 2012), 
which also included some supervisory labor in their estimates.  General labor in the 
current analysis included office labor, which is unclear if it is also included in Hudson et 
al. (2012).  Supervisory labor in this analysis is assumed owner labor and is accounted for 
separately. 
Equation 1.  Equation for calculating general labor hours for water-column oyster aquaculture operations 
in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
	 	 	
. 	 	 	 ,  
To accommodate the time from start-up to full production, general labor in the first year 
of each simulation is estimated to be 50% of the calculated value, and the full value in 
subsequent years.  Supervisory-owner labor is assumed 2,080 hours per year.  The annual 





Figure 8.  Regression of labor estimates in Virginia Aquaculture Industry based on data from Hudson et 
al.(2012). 
Risk Analysis 
Every oyster aquaculture operation has different infrastructure, production, 
marketing, and financing; however, many bottom-culture and water-column culture 
operations share the same sources of uncertainty.  The uncertainty associated with oyster 
production creates a certain amount of risk, which can be estimated based on historical 
production data and conversations with other growers or industry experts.  While 
operations can plan and project production levels and incomes from year to year the 
associated assumptions (costs of inputs, price received for oysters, survival, disease 
impacts) may be unknown and can vary each year.  For example, there may be 
environmental factors such as drought or excess rain that affect oyster growth or survival.  
Differences in spat-on-shell or seed quality occur from year to year.  A difference also 
exists for the amount of investment each operation undertakes regarding equipment 
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needed for production.  The risks common to bottom-culture and water-column culture, 
along with their expected values, are presented in Table 5.  Discussions of the key 
assumption values are presented below.  
 Risk distributions for individual model inputs, based on triangular distributions, 
were used to model the uncertainty in certain input values that can change from year to 
year, and were constructed by designating the minimum value, most likely value, and the 
maximum value for an input (Fairchild et al., 2016; Johnson, 1997).  Triangular 
distributions are used when there is a lack of information regarding the mean or the 
variable may not be symmetric.  All risk analysis distributions in this study are assumed 
to be triangular distributions.  Given these assumptions, the expected price for a bushel of 
oysters ranges from $50-$65 based on the time of year.  For the risk analysis a price of 
$55.00 per bushel with a range of $35.00-$65.00 per bushel is used, which is consistent 
with prices seen in the Virginia extensive spat-on-shell oyster industry (Hudson, 2018).   
Given the paucity of nutrient credit transactions, there is great uncertainty 
surrounding the price of nutrient credits.  Here it is assumed that the price for nitrogen-
credit sales range from $3.00 to $100 with $5.00 being the most likely value.  Weber et 
al. (2018) conducted an analysis with prices ranging from $10 to $190 per pound of 
nitrogen.  The prices for nitrogen removal in this analysis were reduced from those 
proposed by Weber et al (2018) to provide a more conservative approach to estimating 
additional income from nutrient payments.  Generally, phosphorus removal costs are 
twice that of nitrogen among non-point source management practices (Lisa Wainger, 




assumed for phosphorus-credit sales range from $6.00 to $200 with $10.00 being the 
most likely value.   
Nutrient reduction efficiencies for a three-inch diploid oysters are calculated from 
the approved Best Management Practice (BMP) (Cornwell et al., 2016) at a rate of 198 
pounds nitrogen and 22 pounds phosphorus per million oysters harvested, respectively.  
The nutrient removal values for one million harvested three-inch triploid oysters are 287 
pounds of nitrogen and 22 pounds of phosphorus (Cornwell et al., 2016).  It is assumed 
nutrient payments received are net payments and any transaction costs associated with 
receiving nutrient payments have been subtracted from the payment rate. 
Table 5.  Risk distribution input values utilized for bottom-culture and water-column oyster production 









Bushel Oyster Price $35 $55 $65 $51.67 
Price of Nitrogen Payments $3 $5 $100 $36 
Price of Phosphorus 
Payment 
$6 $10 $200 $72 
Average yearly fuel cost $1,000 $3,000 $6,000 $3,333.33 
Cost of vehicle $0 $15,000 $30,000 $15,000 
 
Fuel costs are variable, based on market conditions and the size and type of 
vessel, as well as fuel prices.  Fuel costs are estimated to range from $1,000 to $6,000 per 
year with $3,000 per year being selected as the most likely value.   
Every oyster operation modeled included one vehicle devoted to aquaculture 
operation use.  As operations increase in scale, there may be a need for additional 
vehicles.  Vehicle use varies by operation and includes transporting equipment and 
oysters, and general business use.  Vehicle purchase costs are estimated to range from $0 




Bottom-Culture Aquaculture Risks 
While there are several risks in common between bottom-culture and water-
column oyster production in Maryland, there are unique challenges for each production 
system.  For example, there may be differences in pricing for half-shell oysters, yearly 
survival, and the amount of equipment needed.  Inputs that represent uncertainties in 
bottom-culture are presented in Table 6.  
Some percentage of oysters harvested from bottom-culture operations are suitable 
for sale to the single, half-shell market and this percentage can be increased if the bottom 
is “worked” from time-to-time to break up clusters of oysters.  The expected volume of 
production sold as single oysters is 10% of production with a range of 0% to 25%.  The 
remaining volume of oysters sold as bushels are calculated automatically based on the 
volume determined for single oyster sales. 
The price for half-shell oysters varies on the quality of the product and the desired 
market.  While the average price for single oysters raised in Virginia has been $0.41 per 
oyster (Hudson, 2018), an expected average price of $0.50 per oyster with a range of 
$0.35 to $0.55 per oyster is based on input from producers.   
Every oyster operation model will employ one boat devoted to the aquaculture 
operation with equipment to harvest such as a dredge.  In some cases, these boats were 
previously owned by the operation owner and converted to aquaculture uses.  In other 
cases, a boat must be purchased.  The cost of the boat ranges from $0 to $55,000 per boat 
with the most likely value being estimated at $20,000.  As with vehicles as production 
scales increase beyond levels modeled in this analysis, there may be a need for additional 




Marketing expenses are highly variable between firms and much lower in bottom-
culture of spat-on-shell oysters than in the water-column production of oysters because 
most bottom-culture oysters are destined for the shucked meat market.  A range of $0 to 
$1,000 per year for marketing expenses was estimated with the most likely value being 
$200.  These expenses include, but are not limited to, branding, transportation, samples, 
and promotional marketing materials to gain market access to restaurants and distributors. 
Table 6.  Risk distribution input values utilized for bottom-culture oyster production analysis in the 









Half-shell Oyster Price $0.35 $0.50 $0.55 $0.47 
Percentage of Oysters sold 
to half-shell market 
0% 10% 25% 12% 
Percentage of oysters sold 
to bushel market 
100% 90% 75% 88% 
Marketing expenses $0.00 $200 $1,000 $400 
Monitoring costs $0.00 $300 $1,000 $433.33 
Year 1 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 2 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 3 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 4 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 5 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 6 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 7 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 8 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 9 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Year 10 survival factor 25% 100% 120% 82% 
Cost of harvest vessel $0 $20,000 $55,000 $25,000 
Cost of other equipment $1,500 $5,000 $30,000 $15,500 
 
Monitoring costs (health, growth, and theft prevention) vary among operations.  
Some operations plant spat-on-shell oysters and wait to harvest them in several years, 
while others monitor growth and health more frequently.  A range of $0 to $1,000 per 




To account for variability in survival from year to year, an environmental effect 
factor was incorporated for each year in the model simulation.  This factor calculates 
survival in a range of 25-120% of the predicted 15% overall survival and changes each 
year.  Using these examples, year three survival may be 25% of the predicted 15% 
survival resulting in 3.75% survival of seed from planting to market size for that crop.  
Survival below the predicted value could be attributed to less than optimal environmental 
conditions such as an abnormally low salinity, increased mortality from disease, or other 
factors such as theft.  Survival rates higher than the 15% levels are possible if there is a 
natural recruitment of oysters in the growing area.  For example, in year 6 survival may 
be 120% of the 15% predicted survival resulting in 18% overall survival for that crop. 
“Other” equipment needed may also vary from operation to operation.  Equipment 
could include, but is not limited to, items such as a dredge, tables to sort and cull, 
equipment to break-up clusters of oysters, and harvest basket on the boats, land-based 
refrigeration equipment, or materials handling equipment to transfer spat-on-shell oysters 
to the boat for planting.  The range of values used is $1,500 to $30,000 with $5,000 being 
the most likely value.   
Water-Column Aquaculture Risks 
Like bottom-culture, there are uncertainties in production that are unique to water-
column production of oysters (Table 7).  For example, there may be environmental 
factors such as drought or excess rain that affect oyster growth or survival.  There may 
also be differences in seed quality from year to year, hatchery used, or the genetic lines or 




Single oysters grown in the water column are reported to demand a higher price 
than those grown on the bottom because of shell configuration and amount of meat 
available in comparison to a similar-sized oyster from bottom-culture.  Therefore, a 
higher maximum price was used when compared to bottom-culture for single oyster 
sales.  This price difference could also be attributed to increased marketing through the 
creation of brand names for oysters.  An expected average price of $0.50 per oyster with 
a range of $0.35 to $0.60 per oyster was based on input from producers.   
Double-stack tray cages (Figure 6) vary in price depending on which supplier the 
cages are purchased.  Ketcham Traps charges $101.40 per cage (2018 price).  In contrast 
Hooper’s Island Aquaculture Company charges $87 for a kit and $137 for an assembled 
cage (Hoopers Island Oyster Company, n.d.). A range of $87 to $137 per cage was used 
in the model.  Fifty percent of the required cages were purchased before farm start-up.  
The remaining cages were purchased in year one. 
As with bottom-culture, every oyster operation employs a boat with equipment to 
harvest water-column oysters.  The model assumes one boat per farm.  Some operations 
use traditional commercial fishing boats (Figure 9), while others use small skiffs (Figure 
10).  The model uses an average boat cost per firm, but since the type of boat varies, the 
estimated cost of the boat ranges from $0 to $55,000 per boat with the most likely value 
being $20,000, allowing for cases where boats were already owned and did not have to be 
purchased.  All boats include equipment to hoist cages from the water in order to harvest 





Table 7.  Risk distribution input values utilized for water-column oyster production analysis in the 









Half-shell oyster price $0.35 $0.50 $0.60 $0.48 
Cage cost $87 $101.40 $137 $108.47 
Marketing expenses $0 $4,000 $5,500 $3,166.67 
Monitoring costs $0 $1,000 $2,000 $1000 
Year 1 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 2 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 3 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 4 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 5 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 6 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 7 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 8 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 9 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Year 10 survival factor 35% 100% 125% 87% 
Cost of harvest vessel $0 $25,000 $55,000 $26,667 
Cost of other equipment $15,000 $30,000 $40,000 $28,333 
 
As mentioned previously, marketing expenses are highly variable among 
operations and are much lower in bottom-culture of spat-on-shell oysters than in the 
water-column production of oysters.  A range of $0.00 to $5,500 per year for marketing 
expenses is estimated with the most likely value being $4,000.  These expenses include 
but are not limited to transportation, branding, providing samples, and marketing 
materials to promote product and gain market access to restaurants and distributors. 
Monitoring costs (health, growth, and theft prevention) vary among farms.  A 
range of $0.00 to $2,000 per year is estimated with most likely value being $1,000 per 
year. 
As with bottom-culture, there is variability in survival from year to year in water-




in the water-column model simulation.  This factor calculates survival in a range of 25-
125% of the predicted 50% overall survival and changes each year.  Using these 
estimates, year three survival may be 25% of the predicted 50% survival resulting in 
12.5% survival of seed from planting to market size for that crop.  Survival below the 
predicted value could be attributed to less than optimal environmental conditions such as 
an abnormally low level of salinity or other factors such as disease, theft, or low seed 
quality.  Survival rates higher than the 50% levels may be achieved if growing conditions 
are optimum for a longer period in the year or if higher quality of seed is purchased.  For 
example, year 6 survival may be 125% of the 50% predicted survival resulting in 62.5% 
overall survival.  The upper end of the environmental effect is higher than that of bottom-
culture operations 
 
Figure 9.  Commercial fishing boat used by Honga Oyster Company to harvest bottom cages from their 





Figure 10.  Skiff  used by Orchard Point Oyster Company to harvest bottom cages from their water-column 
oyster operations in Maryland.  (Photo Credit- Suzanne Bricker). 
Also like bottom-culture, “other” equipment is needed and varies from operation 
to operation.  Such equipment may include, but is not limited to, items such as a davit, 
tables to sort and cull oysters on shore, harvest baskets, land-based refrigeration 
equipment, or mechanized sorting and tumbling equipment.  The range of values used is 
$15,000 to $40,000 with $30,000 being the most likely value. 
Financing scenarios modeled  
Each production level is modeled with three financing scenarios.  The first 
scenario uses personal funds for investment without any support from debt financing.  
This approach served as the base model for comparison.  The second scenario uses 
financing from the MARBIDCO Shellfish Aquaculture Loan Fund program, and was 




general, the MARBIDCO program features an interest-only period, historically three 
years, and partial principle forgiveness if all interest only payments are made on time.  
Currently the first loan taken from MARBIDCO features 40% partial principle 
forgiveness, while any subsequent loans are granted 25% principle forgiveness.  The 
remaining principle is amortized over the remaining term of the loan at a higher interest 
rate.  The third scenario modeled used funds from a conventional lending source.  The 
scenario is set up to allow three loans from conventional sources.  All loans are taken at 
the end of the year indicated.  Loans assumed in year zero are considered part of the 
initial capital investment to start the operation.  MARBIDCO limits any single loan to a 
maximum of $100,000.  Multiple loans may be taken over time with an aggregate 
maximum of $300,000.   
MARBIDCO bottom-culture loans in the simulation overlap and are taken in year 
zero, year one, and year two and feature a three-year, interest only period at an interest 
rate of 3.0%.  For the first loan from MARBIDCO, 40% of the original principle was 
forgiven after the interest only period, with the remaining principle amortized over two 
years at an interest rate of 5.0%.  For subsequent MARBIDCO loans, 25% of the original 
principle was forgiven, with the remaining principle amortized over two years at an 
interest rate of 5.0%.  Conventional loans overlap and are taken in year zero, year one, 
and year two, and feature an interest rate of 7.0% amortized over six years.  Loan 
amounts for bottom-culture operations are presented in Table 8.  
Loans terms obtained for water-column operations from MARBIDCO vary based 
on purposes of the loan.  For this analysis, the first loan, taken in year zero, and second 




water-column operations have a three-year interest only period with an interest rate of 
3.0%.  Forty percent of the principle for the first loan, and 25% of the principle of the 
second loan are forgiven, with the remaining principle amortized over a three-year period 
at an interest rate of 5.0%.  The third MARBIDCO water-column operating loan, taken in 
year two, which can include the purchase of seed oysters, features a three-year interest 
only period with an interest rate of 3.0%.  Twenty-five percent of the principle is 
forgiven, with the remaining principle amortized over two years at an interest rate of 
5.0%.  Conventional loan terms for water-column operations are the same as those for 
bottom-culture operations.  Loan amounts for MARBIDCO and conventional loans are 
shown in Table 9 for water-column operations. 
Table 8.  MARBIDCO and Conventional loan amounts for each production level used in bottom-culture 
production analysis for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
  Loan #1 Loan #2 Loan #3 
5 Acres $30,000 $12,000 $12,000 
10 Acres $40,000 $20,000 $20,000 
20 Acres $70,000 $40,000 $40,000 
100 Acres $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 
 
Table 9.  MARBIDCO and Conventional loan amounts for each production level used in water-column 
culture production analysis for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
  Loan #1 Loan #2 Loan #3 
500,000 oysters per year $100,000 $60,000 $20,000 
1,000,000 oysters per year $100,000 $100,000 $35,000 
2,000,000 oysters per year $100,000 $100,000 $70,000 
2,500,000 oysters per year $100,000 $100,000 $87,000 
Metrics to measure success of oyster aquaculture operations in simulations 
To assess if an operations is successful using a given financing mechanism, this 
analysis focuses on accounting financial indicators rather than economic financial ones.  




depreciation, did not seem to be factors used in operator decisions making to start oyster 
aquaculture operations.  Additionally, based on consultation with colleagues, many new 
aquaculture operations are primarily concerned with cash-related items, such as the cost 
of equipment and seed, and accounting profit rather than an economics profit (Carole 
Engle, Engle-Stone Aquatic$, personal communication).  Further, non-cash expenses 
would increase the total costs over time for each operation.  Overall trends expressed by 
examining accounting financial indicators should be representative of the trends seen 
when examining economic costs.    
Due to the variety between and complexity of determining federal, state, and local 
tax payments for an individual operation, all metrics described below were calculated 
before taxes.   
Average Annual Accounting Profit 
Accounting profit (Equation 2) is a measure of the operation’s cash-based 
profitability.  It is often relied on by new operations to determine if they will be able to 
make debt payments as the operation starts (Engle, 2010).  Due to the length of time it 
takes oysters to reach market size, and the resulting lack of revenue in the first few years 
of an operation, annual accounting profit was averaged over the modeled 10-year period.   
Equation 2.  Formula for accounting profit in oyster aquaculture in Maryland. 
	







Net Present Value (NPV)  
The NPV is a method used to calculate the current value of a stream of future cash 
flows (Ruiz Campo and Zuniga-Jara, 2018). NPV (Equation 3) is calculated for each 
iteration and used as an indicator of operation value and profitability.  NPV in the 
simulation is calculated on the predicted cash flows over the first 10 years of operation.  
A discount rate of 8.07% for mollusks operations in developed countries, based on 
articles published in the Web of Science, Scopus (by Elsevier) and ScienceDirect over the 
last 25 years (Campi and Zuniga-Jara, 2018), was used in NPV calculations.  Loan 
principle forgiveness was subtracted from the initial capital investment and subsequent 
operating loans at the time of issuance to reflect the discounted afforded by this practice. 
Equation 3.  Net Present Value 
	 	
	
	 	  
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
A 10-year IRR was calculated based on the first 10 years of the operation.  The 
IRR is the discount rate (See Equation 3) where the NPV will be equal to zero.  If cash 
flows are all negative in any given simulation iteration, it is not possible to determine the 
IRR and is counted as a failed operation. 
Percent of operations with negative IRR and negative NPV 
The percentage of operations having a negative or un-calculable IRR and a 






The payback period was calculated to determine the number of years it takes to 
recoup initial investment costs during the business startup period (Engle, 2010).  The 
model operates for 10 years.  If an operation cannot recoup its initial investment and costs 
in the 10-year simulation, it is considered a failed operation. 
Statistical Analysis 
The model was constructed in such a way where each simulation resulted in an 
individual data set, or population, for each source of financing with nutrient and without 
nutrient payments.  As a result, a single-population mean for the yearly accounting profit, 
NPV, IRR, and payback period was calculated for each scenario.  To determine if there 
was a significant difference (p<0.05) between financing scenarios with and without 
nutrient credit payments, mean yearly accounting profit, mean NPV, mean IRR, and 
mean payback periods were compared via one-way ANOVA.  Significant differences 
(P<0.05) between different pairs of financing scenarios were determined by Tukey’s 
pairwise comparison method using the Microsoft Excel add-in StatTools version 7.6 
(Palisade Corporation, 2018; Keller and Warrack, 2003).  For policy relevance, results 
will only be compared and discussed when either source of financing is held constant, 
thereby, comparing the difference between receiving and not receiving nutrient payments, 
or when the receiving or not receiving nutrient payments is held constant to compare 
differences between financing sources.  For example, MARBIDCO financing with 
nutrient credit payments was compared with MARBIDCO financing without nutrient 
credit payments, and MARBIDCO financing without nutrient credit payments was 





A “what if” sensitivity analysis was performed for all production levels 
comparing each source of capital with and without nutrient payments to determine which 
risk distribution had the greatest effect on the output means of the accounting indicators 
analyzed and are available upon request from the author.  The sensitivity analysis for the 
self-financed operations without nutrient payments (Appendix A) was analyzed, as this 
would show the impacts of risk distributions without the influence of financing or 
nutrient payments.  
Results  
In this analysis, profitability was evaluated based on the average accounting 
income, NPV and IRR over a 10-year period and its payback period.  In addition, the 
percentage of firms with both a negative NPV and negative IRR were determined.  
Operations with a negative NPV and IRR were deemed a failed investment.  Each source 
of capital was evaluated with and without additional income in the form of payments for 
nutrients removed via aquaculture-produced oyster tissue. 
Bottom-culture Results 
 
Current operations utilizing bottom-culture production methods have expressed 
difficulty in determining the average number of bushels harvested per acre.  All bottom-
culture simulations resulted in a mean 745 bushels per harvested acre per year over the 
ten-year model simulation.  The following results are based on the modeled 745 bushels 




Five Acre Bottom-Culture Operation 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit 
The model results suggested that the mean yearly accounting profit would be 
negative for all five-acre bottom-culture operations for all financing scenarios (Table 10).   
Table 10.  Yearly accounting profit for five-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the 
Chesapeake Bay with base model assumptions for each source of capital with and without nutrient 
payments.3 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments -$29,561 -$57,700 $639 $8,027 
Self-financing without nutrient payments -$31,713 -$58,639 -$4,906 $7,829 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$28,437 -$56,577 $1,763 $8,027 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-$30,589 -$57,515 -$3,782 $7,829 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$35,587 -$63,726 -$5,387 $8,027 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-$37,739 -$64,665 -$10,932 $7,829 
Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return 
The model results suggested that the mean NPV and mean IRR would be negative 






                                                 
3 Discussion for bottom-culture operations will be in terms of lease size rather than total yearly 





Table 11.  NPV for 5 acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the Chesapeake Bay with 
base model assumptions for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Net Present Value  Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments -$230,458 -$423,296 -$27,648 $52,223 
Self-financing without nutrient payments -$244,133 -$429,199 -$63,196 $50,970 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$218,426 -$411,263 -$15,616 $52,223 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-$232,101 -$417,167 -$51,163 $50,970 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$275,328 -$468,165 -$72,517 $52,223 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-$289,003 -$474,069 -$108,065 $50,970 
 
Table 12.  IRR for five-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the Chesapeake Bay with 
base model assumptions for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
10 Year Internal Rate of Return Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments -23.94% -78.46% 1.16% 11.77% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments -27.04% -73.01% -9.02% 12.83% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments -22.70% -58.42% 3.62% 10.69% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-23.76% -53.29% -8.18% 10.14% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments -28.83% -53.23% -9.25% 12.30% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-29.44% -54.89% -15.85% 10.92% 
 
Payback Period 
The model results suggest no operations were able to recover the initial 
investment or operating expenses in the 10-year model simulation, regardless of the 
source of capital or receiving nutrient payments. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The input risk distributions with the greatest impact on the mean yearly profit and 
NPV were the price per bushel and percentage of oysters sold to the half-shell market 




the IRR of operations with self-financing without nutrient payments (Appendix A, Figure 
A-3) survival in year three and five were the two top influences on the IRR of modeled 
firms.   
Five-Acre Model Discussion 
Based on the analysis of the accounting profit, NPV, IRR, and payback period, a 
five-acre bottom-culture operation would not be profitable and would not represent an 
ideal investment opportunity for any of the financing scenarios in the simulation.  An 
enterprise budget (Appendix B, Table B-1) was prepared for the total cost over the 10-
year simulation for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments to 
determine input costs that may affect the profitability of a five-acre bottom-culture oyster 
operation.   
With all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments, mean labor costs 
represented over 70% of the total fixed and variable cost of the operation over a ten-year 
period.  The cost of spat-on-shell oysters was the next highest percentage of total fixed 
and variable costs.  Mean accounting break-even costs for each source of capital without 
nutrient payments are presented in Table 13.  The resulting accounting break-even prices 
per bushel from the model are much higher than what could realistically be expected 
based on current industry averages due to the costs associated with paid labor.  Receiving 
nutrient payments has no effect on the cost of production since all payments received are 






Table 13.  Break-even cost of production for five-acre bottom-culture aquaculture operations in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay per bushel marketed from all sources of capital funding given the original base 
model assumptions. 
Mean Accounting Break Even Price over 10 years $ per bushel 
Self-financing $91.17 
MARBIDCO Financing  $92.06 
Conventional Financing  $92.43 
 
Ten-acre Bottom-Culture Operation 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit 
The model results suggested that the mean yearly accounting profit for all ten-acre 
bottom-culture operations would be positive for all financing scenarios (Table 14).   
Table 14.  Yearly accounting profit for ten-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $17,685 -$32,382 $76,415 $15,978 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $13,397 -$36,508 $70,592 $15,619 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments $19,391 -$30,676 $78,120 $15,978 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments $15,103 -$34,803 $72,297 $15,619 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments $8,758 -$41,309 $67,487 $15,978 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments $4,470 -$45,436 $61,664 $15,619 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 









Table 15.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of yearly accounting profit confidence interevals for 
each source of capital with and without nutrient payments for ten-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster 
aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay operations.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are 
marked with an * and confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1-Scenario 2 
Difference 





without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$4,288* -$5,188 -$3,387 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$10,633* -$11,534 -$9,733 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$8,927* -$9,828 -$8,027 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$10,633* -$11,534 -$9,733 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-$8,927* -$9,828 -$8,027 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$4,288* $3,387 $5,188 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
$1,706* $805 $2,606 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





$4,288* $3,387 $5,188 
 
Net Present Value 
The model results suggested that the mean NPV for all ten-acre bottom-culture 
operations would be positive for all financing scenarios, except ones where conventional 
financing was used (Table 16).   
Table 16.  NPV for ten-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake 
Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Net Present Value (Income, expenses, debt) Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $65,799 -$249,762 $441,259 $102,534 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $38,552 -$281,046 $394,807 $100,263 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments $83,766 -$231,794 $459,226 $102,534 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments $56,520 -$263,078 $412,775 $100,263 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments -$250 -$315,811 $375,210 $102,534 




An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean NPV when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  
Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using 
Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 17. 
Table 17.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of NPV confidence interevals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for ten-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$27,246* -$33,026 -$21,467 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$84,017* -$89,796 -$78,237 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$66,049* -$71,829 -$60,269 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$84,017* -$89,796 -$78,237 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$66,049* -$71,829 -$60,269 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$27,246* $21,467 $33,026 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
$17,968* $12,188 $23,747 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





$27,246* $21,467 $33,026 
 
Internal Rate of Return 
The model results suggested that the mean IRR for all ten-acre bottom-culture 
operations would be positive for all financing scenarios (Table 18).   
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean IRR when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  Confidence 
intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using Tukey’s 




Table 18.  IRR for ten-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake 
Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
10 Year Internal Rate of Return Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 16.80% -45.57% 59.04% 13.40% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 13.64% -60.13% 57.65% 13.57% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 21.18% -57.28% 75.71% 15.25% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 17.73% -55.50% 73.90% 15.20% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 8.26% -42.71% 47.05% 12.87% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 5.30% -44.90% 45.66% 12.78% 
 
Table 19.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of IRR confidence interevals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for ten-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-2.96%* -3.78% -2.13% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-12.43%* -13.25% -11.60% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-8.34%* -9.16% -7.51% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-12.92%* -13.73% -12.11% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-8.54%* -9.35% -7.73% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
3.45%* 2.63% 4.26% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
4.38%* 3.57% 5.18% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
4.09%* 3.27% 4.91% 




3.16%* 2.35% 3.97% 
 
Percentage of firms with negative NPV and negative IRR 
The model results suggested that MARBIDCO financed firms had the lowest 
percentage of negative NPV and negative IRR (Table 20).  Firms with conventional 
financing had the highest percentage of operations with a negative NPV and negative 




Table 20.  Percentage of firms with negative NPV and IRR for ten-acre bottom-culture operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for all sources of capital with and without nutrient layments. 
Operations with negative NPV & negative IRR % 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 23.76% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 31.64% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 18.14% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 24.54% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 47.44% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 57.40% 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean percentage of operations with a negative NPV and negative IRR when comparing 
all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant 
financing scenarios pairs were compared using Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and 
are presented in Table 21. 
Table 21.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of operations with negative NPV and IRR  confidence 
interevals for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments for ten-acre bottom-culture 
operation for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in 
means are marked with an * and confience interevals are in bold.. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 
of Mean Percentage of 
operations with negative 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-9.96%* -12.64% -7.28% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-32.87%* -35.55% -30.19% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-25.77%* -28.45% -23.10% 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-29.31%* -31.94% -26.67% 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-23.69%* -26.33% -21.05% 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
6.40%* 3.77% 9.03% 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
5.62%* 3.00% 8.23% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
7.10%* 4.45% 9.74% 









The model results suggested the mean payback period (7-8 years) was similar for 
all financing scenarios (Table 22).   
Table 22.  Payback period for ten-acre bottom-culture operations for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland 
Chesapeake Bay for all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Payback Period Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 7 3 11 2.28 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 7 3 11 2.40 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 7 3 11 2.57 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 7 3 11 2.63 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 7 3 11 2.46 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 8 3 11 2.46 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 













Table 23.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of payback period (years) confidence interevals for each 
source of capital with and without nutrientnutrinet payments for ten-acre bottom-culture operation for 
oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are 
marked with an * and confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 







without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
0.58* 0.44 0.72 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing without 
nutrient payments 
0.66* 0.52 0.80 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
0.89* 0.75 1.03 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
0.67* 0.53 0.81 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
0.84* 0.70 0.98 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing without 
nutrient payments 
-0.60* -0.74 -0.46 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
0.17* 0.03 0.31 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
0.23* 0.09 0.37 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
-0.54* -0.68 -0.40 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The input risk distributions with the greatest impact on the mean yearly profit, 
NPV, and IRR were the price per bushel, percentage of oysters sold to the half-shell 
market, and survival in various years (Appendix A, Figures A-4, A-5, & A-6).   
Ten-acre Model Discussion 
A ten-acre bottom-culture operation can be a viable business, but there is still a 
high chance of failure when using a negative NPV and IRR as metrics for success (Table 
20).  Operations that were MARBIDCO financed resulted in a higher yearly accounting 
profit, NPV, and IRR than operations with other forms of financing.  The significant 
differences between MARBIDCO and other financing options are attributed to the 




that reduce the overall costs associated with principle and interest payments over the ten-
year model.   
In addition, simulations showed operations with MARBIDCO financing had a 
lower percentage of firms with a negative NPV and negative IRR.  The differences seen 
between self-financed and conventionally financed operations in mean accounting profit, 
NPV, and IRR are caused by the increased costs associated with debt financing when 
compared to self-financing.  While the amount of personal investment to start the 
operation is reduced using debt, monthly principle and interest payments affect yearly 
cash flow in a negative manner.   
An enterprise budget (Appendix B, Table B-2) was prepared for the total cost 
over the 10-year simulation for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments 
to determine which input costs that affect the profitability of a ten-acre bottom-culture 
oyster operation.  As with the five-acre bottom-culture operation, labor was the primary 
expense in the ten-acre bottom-culture operation representing over 65% of the total costs 
for all financing scenarios.   
The price of spat-on-shell oysters was the second highest input cost as a 
percentage of total fixed and variable costs.  Mean accounting break-even costs for each 
source of capital payments are presented in Table 24.  Break-even cost of production 
prices are in the middle of the reported current industry pricing structure and within the 
model-pricing assumptions.  As with five-acre bottom-culture operations, break-even 
prices are higher for operations utilizing debt financing, reflecting the effects of principle 




Table 24.  Break-even cost of production for ten-acre bottom-culture operations for oyster aquaculture in 
the Maryland Chesapeake Bay from all sources of capital. 
Mean Accounting Break Even Price over 10 years $ per bushel 
Self-financing $50.62 
MARBIDCO Financing  $51.25 
Conventional Financing  $51.55 
 
Twenty-Acre Bottom-Culture Operation 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit 
The model results suggested that the mean yearly accounting profit for all twenty-
acre bottom-culture operations would be positive for all financing scenarios (Table 25).   
Table 25.  Yearly accounting profit for twenty-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $121,312 -$5,902 $239,631 $34,770 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $111,772 -$9,422 $224,515 $33,759 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$124,379 -$2,835 $242,698 $34,770 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$114,838 -$6,355 $227,582 $33,759 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$105,197 -$22,016 $223,517 $34,770 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$95,657 -$25,537 $208,400 $33,759 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 






Table 26.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of yearly accounting profit confidence interevals for 
each source of capital with and without nutrient payments for twenty-acre bottom-culture operation for 
oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are 
marked with an * and confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 





without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$8,673* -$10,448 -$6,898 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$19,983* -$21,758 -$18,209 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$16,739* -$18,514 -$14,965 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$19,983* -$21,758 -$18,209 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-$16,739* -$18,514 -$14,965 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$8,673* $6,898 $10,448 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
$3,244* $1,469 $5,019 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





$8,673* $6,898 $10,448 
 
Net Present Value 
The model results suggested that the mean NPV for all twenty-acre bottom-
culture operations would be positive for all financing scenarios (Table 27).   
Table 27.  NPV for twenty-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture in Maryland Chesapeake for each 
source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Net Present Value  Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $656,786 -$99,497 $1,342,252 $201,070 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $601,672 -$119,228 $1,228,591 $195,202 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments $690,634 -$65,648 $1,376,100 $201,070 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$635,521 -$85,379 $1,262,440 $195,202 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments $533,421 -$222,862 $1,218,887 $201,070 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 





An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean NPV when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  
Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using 
Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 28. 
Table 28.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of NPV confidence interevals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrientpayments for twenty-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold.. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1-Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
-$55,113* -$66,407 -$43,819 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$157,214* -$168,508 -$145,919 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
-$123,365* -$134,659 -$112,071 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
-$157,214* -$168,508 -$145,919 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$123,365* -$134,659 -$112,071 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$55,113* $43,819 $66,407 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
$33,849* $22,554 $45,143 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
$33,849* $22,554 $45,143 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
$55,113* $43,819 $66,407 
 
Internal Rate of Return 
The model results suggested that the mean IRR for all twenty-acre bottom-culture 
operations would be positive for all financing scenarios (Table 29).   
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean IRR when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  Confidence 
intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using Tukey’s 




Table 29.  IRR for twenty-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland 
Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
10 Year Internal Rate of Return Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 61.56% -2.55% 122.40% 14.95% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 58.12% -5.01% 113.73% 14.77% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 81.80% -0.23% 227.01% 22.96% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 77.22% -3.00% 206.80% 22.29% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 48.55% -12.64% 102.10% 14.21% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 45.05% -15.04% 96.43% 14.09% 
 
Table 30.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of IRR confidence interevals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrinet payments for twenty-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold.. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
-3.49%* -4.50% -2.49% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-32.17%* -33.17% -31.16% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
-13.06%* -14.07% -12.06% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
-33.25%* -34.26% -32.24% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-13.02%* -14.02% -12.01% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
4.57%* 3.57% 5.58% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
20.23%* 19.23% 21.24% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
19.10%* 18.10% 20.11% 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
3.44%* 2.44% 4.45% 
 
Percentage of firms with negative NPV and negative IRR 
The model results suggested over 99.5% of all operations had a positive NPV and 





Table 31.  Percentage of firms with negative NPV and IRR for twenty-acre bottom-culture operationl for 
oyster aquaculture in the Chesapeake for all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Operations with negative NPV & negative IRR % 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 0.04% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 0.04% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 0.02% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 0.04% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 0.22% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 0.32% 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean percentage of operations with a negative NPV and negative IRR when comparing 
all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant 
financing scenarios pairs were compared using Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and 
are presented in Table 32. 
Table 32.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of operations with negative NPV and IRR  confidence 
interevals for each source of capital with and without nutrinet payments for twenty-acre bottom-culture 
operation for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in 
means are marked with an * and confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 
of Mean Percentage of 
Operations with Negative 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-0.10% -0.29% 0.09% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-0.28%* -0.47% -0.09% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-0.28%* -0.47% -0.09% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-0.20%* -0.39% -0.01% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-0.18% -0.37% 0.01% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
0.02% -0.17% 0.21% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
0.02% -0.17% 0.21% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 










The model results suggested the mean payback period (3-4 years) was similar for 
all financing scenarios (Table 33).   
Table 33.  Payback period for twenty-acre bottom-culture operations for oyster aquaculture in the 
Chesapeake for all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Payback Period Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 3 3 11 0.65 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 3 3 11 0.72 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 3 2 11 0.55 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 3 2 11 0.62 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 3 2 11 0.76 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 4 3 11 0.84 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean payback period when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  
Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using 













Table 34.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of payback period (years) confidence interevals for each 
source of capital with and without nutrinet payments for twenty-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster 
aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with 
an * and confience interevals are in bold.. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 





without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.09* 0.05 0.13 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
0.30* 0.26 0.33 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
0.01 -0.03 0.05 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.27* 0.23 0.31 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
0.00 -0.04 0.04 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-0.07* -0.11 -0.03 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-0.28* -0.32 -0.24 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





-0.08* -0.12 -0.04 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The input risk distributions with the greatest impact on the mean yearly profit and 
NPV were the price per bushel and percentage of oysters sold to the half-shell market 
(Appendix A, Figures A-7 & A-8).  The risk distributions that had the greatest impacts on 
the IRR were price per bushel and the survival of oysters in year three of the operation 
(Appendix A, Figure A-9).   
Twenty-Acre Model Discussion 
Based on the model assumptions, a twenty-acre bottom-culture operation can be a 
viable business, but the chances of failure increase if conventional debt financing is used.  
As with the ten-acre production model, mean yearly accounting profit, NPV, and IRR 




financing sources.  Firms with MARBIDCO financing also had the lowest percentage of 
negative NPV and negative IRR.  Firms with conventional financing had the highest 
percentage of operations with a negative NPV and negative IRR.  Mean payback period 
was similar for all operations.   
An enterprise budget (Appendix B, Table B-3) was prepared for the total cost 
over the 10-year simulation for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments 
to determine which input costs may affect the profitability of a twenty-acre bottom-
culture oyster operation.  As with the five-acre and ten-acre bottom-culture operations, 
labor was the primary expense in the twenty-acre bottom-culture operation representing 
over 55% of the total costs.  The price of spat-on-shell oysters was the second highest 
input cost as a percentage of total costs.  Mean accounting break-even costs for each 
source of capital payments are presented in Table 35.  These estimates are below the 
pricing assumptions and below the prices previously reported by growers who sell 
product during the summer.   
Table 35.  Break-even cost of production for twenty-acre bottom-culture operations for oyster aquaculture 
in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay from all sources of capital. 
Mean Accounting Break Even Price over 10 years $ per bushel 
Self-financing $30.59 
MARBIDCO Financing  $31.16 





One Hundred-Acre Bottom-Culture Operation 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit 
The model results suggested that the mean yearly accounting profit for all one-
hundred acre bottom-culture operations would be positive for all financing scenarios 
(Table 36).     
Table 36.  Yearly accounting profit for one hundred-acre bottom-culturecutlure operation for oyster 
aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient 
payments. 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $864,205 $338,730 $1,467,693 $157,008 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $821,243 $316,288 $1,401,941 $153,433 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$871,060 $345,586 $1,474,549 $157,008 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$828,099 $323,144 $1,408,796 $153,433 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$830,727 $305,252 $1,434,215 $157,008 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$787,765 $282,810 $1,368,463 $153,433 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 










Table 37.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of yearly accounting profit confidence interevals for 
each source of capital with and without nutrient payments for one hundred-acre bottom-culture operation 
for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are 
marked with an * and confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 





without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$42,962* -$51,809 -$34,114 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$40,333* -$49,181 -$31,486 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$33,478* -$42,325 -$24,631 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$40,333* -$49,181 -$31,486 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$33,478* -$42,325 -$24,631 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$42,962* $34,114 $51,809 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
$6,855 -$1,992 $15,703 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





$42,962* $34,114 $51,809 
 
Net Present Value 
The model results suggested that the mean NPV for all one-hundred acre bottom-
culture operations would be positive for all financing scenarios (Table 38).   
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 








Table 38.  NPV for one hundred-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Net Present Value  Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $5,372,205 $2,053,194 $9,251,278 $999,496 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $5,099,297 $1,909,801 $8,831,706 $976,883 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$5,441,176 $2,122,164 $9,320,248 $999,496 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$5,168,268 $1,978,772 $8,900,677 $976,883 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$5,129,291 $1,810,279 $9,008,363 $999,496 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$4,856,383 $1,666,886 $8,588,791 $976,883 
 
Table 39.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of NPV confidence interevals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for one hundred-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$272,908* -$329,234 -$216,582 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$311,885* -$368,211 -$255,559 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$242,915* -$299,241 -$186,589 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$311,885* -$368,211 -$255,559 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-$242,915* -$299,241 -$186,589 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$272,908* $216,582 $329,234 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
$68,971* $12,645 $125,297 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





$272,908* $216,582 $329,234 
 
Internal Rate of Return 
The model results suggested that the mean IRR for all one-hundred acre bottom-




Table 40.  IRR for one hundred-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
10 Year Internal Rate of Return Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 163.97% 83.63% 289.59% 28.68% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 158.17% 78.47% 280.85% 28.10% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 225.70% 101.82% 625.64% 53.89% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 216.79% 98.02% 588.97% 51.53% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 150.65% 71.80% 270.04% 27.61% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 144.90% 67.23% 261.45% 27.07% 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 
compared using Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 41. 
Table 41.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of IRR confidence interevals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for one hundred-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster aquaculture 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-5.75%* -7.92% -3.59% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-71.89%* -74.06% -69.72% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-13.27%* -15.44% -11.11% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-75.05%* -77.22% -72.88% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-13.32%* -15.49% -11.16% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
8.91%* 6.74% 11.08% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
61.73%* 59.56% 63.89% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
58.62%* 56.45% 60.79% 









Percentage of firms with negative NPV and negative IRR 
The model resulted suggest all operations had a positive NPV and positive IRR 
for all financing scenarios.   
Payback Period 
The model resulted the mean payback period was two years for all sources of 
capital except self-financed operations (Table 42).   
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean payback period when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  
Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using 
Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 43. 
Table 42.  Payback period for one hundred-acre bottom-culture operations for oyster aquaculture in the 
Chesapeake for all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Payback Period Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 3 2 4 0.50 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 3 2 4 0.50 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 2 2 3 0.33 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 2 2 3 0.35 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 2 2 4 0.41 











Table 43.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of payback period (years) confidence interevals for each 
source of capital with and without nutrinet payments for twenty-acre bottom-culture operation for oyster 
aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with 
an * and confience interevals are in bold.. 
Confidence Interval Tests 






Conventional Financing without 
nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.03* 0.01 0.06 
Conventional Financing without 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
0.09* 0.07 0.12 




-0.31* -0.34 -0.29 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.08* 0.06 0.10 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-0.29* -0.32 -0.27 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-0.02 -0.04 0.01 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-0.37* -0.40 -0.35 




-0.41* -0.43 -0.38 




-0.05* -0.08 -0.03 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The input risk distributions with the greatest impact on the mean yearly profit, and 
NPV were the price per bushel and percentage of oysters sold to the half-shell (Appendix 
A, Figures A-10 & A-11).  The risk distributions that had the greatest impacts on the IRR 
were price per bushel and the survival of oysters in year 3 of the operation (Appendix A, 
Figure A-12).   
One Hundred-Acre Model Discussion 
Results show a one hundred-acre bottom-culture operation is successful with the 
model assumptions for all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments.  
MARBIDCO financed operations significantly outperformed those with other sources of 




program.  However, there was not a significant difference in mean yearly accounting 
profit between self-financed and MARBIDCO financed operations.  The similarity of the 
mean yearly accounting profit for these two funding sources is attributed to the reduced 
amount of MARBIDCO funds as a percentage of the overall initial investment and yearly 
operating expenses. 
An enterprise budget (Appendix B, Table B-4) was prepared for the total cost 
over the 10-year simulation for each source of capital with and without nutrient 
payments.  Unlike the five-acre, ten-acre, and twenty-acre bottom-culture operations, the 
cost of spat-on-shell oysters was the highest input cost representing over 60% of total 
fixed and variable costs.  The second highest production cost was associated with paid 
labor representing over 24% of total costs.  Mean accounting break-even costs for each 
source of capital payments are presented in Table 44.  These estimates are below the 
pricing assumptions and below prices previously reported by growers who sell product 
during the summer.  Self-financed operations had lower break-even prices than those 
with debt financing.  Operations with MARBIDCO financing had a lower break-even 
price than those with conventional financing due to the principle forgiveness feature of 
the MARBIDCO loan program.  All break-even prices were below the range estimated in 
the simulation. 
Table 44.  Break-even cost of production for one hundred-acre bottom-culture operations for oyster 
aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay from all sources of capital. 
Mean Accounting Break Even Price over 10 years $ per bushel 
Self-financing $14.59 
MARBIDCO Financing  $14.79 






When describing their operations, water-column oyster operations in Maryland 
primarily produce and sell single oysters to the half-shell markets, and commonly refer to 
the number of oysters they harvest each year, rather than the number of bushels.  
Therefore, water-column operations in this study are discussed in terms of the number of 
oysters they are predicted to harvest each year based on the model assumptions 
previously described.  The predicted harvest was based on assumptions before the 
environmental factor has been incorporated.   
Five hundred thousand oysters harvested per year water-column operation 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit 
The model results suggested that the mean yearly accounting profit would be 
negative for all water-column operations producing 500,000 oysters per year for all 
financing scenarios (Table 45).    
Table 45.  Yearly accounting profit for a 500,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the Maryland 
Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments -$35,379 -$107,477 $37,151 $21,839 
Self-financing without nutrient payments -$39,595 -$110,225 $29,164 $21,564 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$32,312 -$104,411 $40,217 $21,839 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-$36,529 -$107,159 $32,230 $21,564 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$39,102 -$111,200 $33,427 $21,839 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 





Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return 
The model results suggested that the mean NPV and mean IRR would be negative 
for all water-column operations producing 500,000 oysters per year for all financing 
scenarios (Table 46 and Table 47). 
Table 46.  NPV for 500,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay for 
each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Net Present Value  Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments -$329,085 -$806,877 $129,470 $143,431 
Self-financing without nutrient payments -$356,650 -$824,640 $95,696 $141,632 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$293,870 -$771,662 $164,684 $143,431 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-$321,435 -$789,425 $130,911 $141,632 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$358,953 -$836,745 $99,601 $143,431 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-$386,518 -$854,508 $65,828 $141,632 
 
Table 47.  IRR  for a 500,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay for 
each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
10 Year Internal Rate of Return Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments -11.51% -56.45% 17.54% 10.93% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments -12.61% -54.31% 15.68% 10.36% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments -9.62% -56.41% 22.74% 11.26% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-11.05% -54.98% 20.35% 10.76% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments -12.71% -55.13% 14.93% 10.28% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
-14.02% -57.88% 13.18% 10.13% 
 
Percentage of firms with negative NPV and negative IRR 
The model results suggested over 90% of water-column operations producing 
500,000 oyster per year would have a negative mean NPV and negative mean IRR for all 




Table 48.  Percentage of firms with negative NPV and IRR for a 500,000 oyster per year water-column 
operation  in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay  for all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Operations with negative NPV & negative IRR % 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 97.52% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 98.78% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 94.42% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 96.78% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 98.82% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 99.26% 
 
Payback Period 
The model results suggest the mean payback period was longer than the 
simulation (>10 years) for all financing scenarios. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The input risk distribution with the greatest impact on the mean yearly profit, 
NPV, and IRR was the price per oyster followed by survival in various years of the 
operation (Appendix A, Figures A-13, A-14, & A-15).   
Five hundred thousand oysters per year Model Discussion 
Based on the analysis of the accounting profit, NPV, IRR, and payback period an 
operation utilizing the original model assumption, a 500,000 oyster per year water-
column operation would not be profitable and would not represent an ideal investment 
opportunity for any of the sources of capital in the simulation.  An enterprise budget 
(Appendix B, Table B-5) was prepared for the total cost over the 10-year model 
simulation for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments to determine 
input costs that may affect the profitability of a 500,000 oysters per year water-column 
operation.  With all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments, labor costs 




period.  The cost of seed was the second highest percentage of total fixed and variable 
costs.  Mean accounting break-even costs for each source of capital payments are 
presented in Table 49.  Break-even prices are within the range of prices analyzed in the 
model, but above the most likely price of $0.55 per oyster.   
Table 49.  Break-even cost of production for 500,000 oyster per year water-column operations in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay from all sources of capital. 
Mean Accounting Break Even Price over 10 years $ per oyster 
Self-financing $0.56 
MARBIDCO Financing  $0.57 
Conventional Financing  $0.57 
 
One Million Oysters per year Water-Column Operation 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit 
The model results suggested that the mean yearly accounting profit would be 
positive for all water-column operations producing 1,000,000 oysters per year for all 
financing scenarios (Table 50).  
Table 50.  Yearly accounting profit for a 1,000,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $65,724 -$77,284 $214,686 $45,045 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $57,279 -$80,838 $198,942 $44,431 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$69,291 -$73,718 $218,253 $45,045 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$60,846 -$77,271 $202,509 $44,431 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$60,863 -$82,145 $209,825 $45,045 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$52,418 -$85,699 $194,081 $44,431 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 




scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 
compared using Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 51 
Table 51.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of yearly accounting profit confidence intervals for each 
source of capital with and without nutrient payments for a 1,000,000, oyster per year water-column 
operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an 
* and confidence intervals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1-Scenario 2 
Difference 






without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$8,445* -$10,995 -$5,895 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$8,428* -$10,977 -$5,878 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$4,861* -$7,411 -$2,311 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$8,428* -$10,977 -$5,878 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-$4,861* -$7,411 -$2,311 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$8,445* $5,895 $10,995 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
$3,567* $1,017 $6,117 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
$3,567* $1,017 $6,117 




$8,445* $5,895 $10,995 
 
Net Present Value 
The model results suggested that the mean NPV would be positive for all water-
column operations producing 1,000,000 oysters per year for all financing scenarios 
(Table 52).  An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between 
the mean NPV when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  
Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using 





Table 52.  NPV  for 1,000,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Net Present Value  Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $282,092 -$671,707 $1,258,370 $294,381 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $226,880 -$694,650 $1,142,848 $290,383 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments $323,322 -$630,477 $1,299,600 $294,381 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$268,110 -$653,420 $1,184,078 $290,383 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments $243,598 -$710,201 $1,219,876 $294,381 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$188,386 -$733,144 $1,104,355 $290,383 
 
Table 53.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of NPV confidence intervals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for 1,000,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the Maryland 
Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience interevals 
are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1-Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$55,212* -$71,877 -$38,547 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$79,724* -$96,388 -$63,059 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$38,494* -$55,158 -$21,829 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$79,724* -$96,388 -$63,059 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$38,494* -$55,158 -$21,829 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$55,212* $38,547 $71,877 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
$41,230* $24,565 $57,895 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





$55,212* $38,547 $71,877 
 
Internal Rate of Return 
The model results suggested that the mean IRR would be positive for all water-
column operations producing 1,000,000 oysters per year for all financing scenarios 




An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean IRR when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  Confidence 
intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using Tukey’s 
pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 55.   
Table 54.  IRR  for a 1,000,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
10 Year Internal Rate of Return Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 19.78% -40.12% 57.22% 12.64% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 17.57% -43.29% 55.51% 12.75% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 23.38% -47.80% 67.23% 14.12% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
20.95% -42.56% 65.23% 14.16% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 17.84% -54.12% 54.79% 12.64% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
15.69% -41.91% 53.09% 12.70% 
 
Table 55.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of IRR confidence intervals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for a 1,000,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences(p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
-2.16%* -2.91% -1.40% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-5.26%* -6.02% -4.51% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
-1.89%* -2.64% -1.13% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
-5.54%* -6.29% -4.78% 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-1.93%* -2.69% -1.18% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
2.43%* 1.68% 3.19% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
3.61%* 2.85% 4.36% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 
3.38%* 2.62% 4.14% 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
Self-financing without nutrient 
payments 





Percentage of firms with negative NPV and negative IRR 
The model results suggested MARBIDCO financed firms had a lower percentage 
of operations with a negative NPV and negative IRR, while conventionally financed 
operations had the highest percentage of operations with a negative NPV and negative 
IRR (Table 56).   
Table 56.  Percentage of firms with negative NPV and IRR for a 1,000,000 oyster per year water-column 
operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Operations with negative NPV & negative IRR % 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 17.24% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 21.54% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 14.10% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 17.46% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 20.66% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient payments 25.20% 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 












Table 57.  Results of Tukey’s parwise comparison of operations with negative NPV and IRR  confidence 
interevals for each source of capital with and without nutrinet payments for a 1,000,000 oyster per year 
water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are 
marked with an * and confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 
of Mean Percentage of 
Operations with a 





without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
-4.54%* -6.80% -2.29% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-7.75%* -10.01% -5.49% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-3.66%* -5.92% -1.40% 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
-6.57%* -8.82% -4.32% 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-3.42%* -5.67% -1.17% 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
3.37%* 1.11% 5.62% 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
3.15%* 0.90% 5.40% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
4.09%* 1.83% 6.35% 




4.30%* 2.05% 6.56% 
 
Payback Period 
 The model results suggested that the mean payback period would be 5-7 years for 
all water-column operations producing 1,000,000 oysters per year for all financing 
scenarios (Table 58).   
Table 58.  Payback period for a 1,000,000  oyster per year water-column operation in the Maryland 
Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Year farm gets back to positive cash balance Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 6 3 11 2.15 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 6 3 11 2.27 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 5 2 11 2.39 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 5 2 11 2.58 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 6 2 11 2.52 




An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 
compared using Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 59. 
Table 59.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of payback period confidence intervals for each source 
of capital with and without nutrient payments for a 1,000,000 oyster per year water-column operation in 
the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and 
confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 







without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
1.24* 1.11 1.38 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
1.80* 1.66 1.93 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
0.68* 0.54 0.82 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.92* 0.78 1.06 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-0.21* -0.35 -0.07 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-0.37* -0.51 -0.23 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-1.13* -1.27 -0.99 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-1.11* -1.25 -0.98 




-0.35* -0.49 -0.22 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The input risk distribution with the greatest impact on the mean yearly profit, 
NPV, and IRR was the price per oyster, followed by survival (Appendix A, Figures A-16, 
A-17, A-18).   
One million oysters per year Model Discussion 
Based on the original model assumptions, a 1,000,000 oysters per year operation 




MARBIDCO financing performed better financially than those with other forms of 
financing due to the interest only period and principle forgiveness features of the 
program. 
 An enterprise budget (Appendix B, Table B-6) was prepared for the total cost 
over the 10-year model simulation for each source of capital with and without nutrient 
payments.  With all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments, costs 
associated with paid employees was the highest percentage of total cost, representing 
over 65% of the total cost of the operation over a ten-year period.  As seen with the 
500,000 oyster per year model, the cost of seed was the second highest percentage of 
total fixed and variable costs.   
Mean accounting break-even costs for each source of capital payments are 
presented in Table 60.  Break-even prices are within the range of prices analyzed in the 
model, and below the most likely price of $0.55 per oyster.   
Table 60.  Break-even cost of production for a 1,000,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital. 
Mean Accounting Break Even Price over 10 years $ per oyster 
Self-financing $0.38 
MARBIDCO Financing  $0.38 
Conventional Financing  $0.39 
 
Two Million Oysters per year Water-Column Operation 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit 
The model results suggested that the mean yearly accounting profit would be 
positive for all water-column operations producing 2,000,000 oysters per year for all 




Table 61.  Yearly accounting profit for a 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $307,915 $55,775 $611,210 $87,506 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $290,885 $50,021 $579,892 $86,260 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$311,847 $59,707 $615,143 $87,506 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$294,817 $53,954 $583,825 $86,260 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$302,330 $50,190 $605,625 $87,506 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$285,300 $44,437 $574,307 $86,260 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 















Table 62.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of yearly accounting profit confidence intervals for each 
source of capital with and without nutrient payments for a 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column 
operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an 
* and confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 






without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$17,030* -$21,982 -$12,078 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$9,517* -$14,470 -$4,565 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$5,585* -$10,537 -$633 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$9,517* -$14,470 -$4,565 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-$5,585* -$10,537 -$633 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$17,030* $12,078 $21,982 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
$3,933 -$1,019 $8,885 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





$17,030* $12,078 $21,982 
 
Net Present Value 
The model results suggested that the mean NPV would be positive for all water-
column operations producing 2,000,000 oysters per year for all financing scenarios 
(Table 63). 
Table 63.  NPV  for a 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Net Present Value  Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $1,771,471 $160,691 $3,746,446 $571,453 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $1,660,138 $86,099 $3,586,563 $563,366 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments $1,816,597 $205,817 $3,791,572 $571,453 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$1,705,264 $131,226 $3,631,690 $563,366 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments $1,727,793 $117,013 $3,702,768 $571,453 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 




An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean NPV when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  
Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using 
Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 64.   
Table 64.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of NPV confidence intervals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for a 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$111,333* -$143,674 -$78,993 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$88,805* -$121,145 -$56,464 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$43,678* -$76,019 -$11,338 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$88,805* -$121,145 -$56,464 




-$43,678* -$76,019 -$11,338 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$111,333* $78,993 $143,674 




$45,126* $12,786 $77,467 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
$45,126* $12,786 $77,467 




$111,333* $78,993 $143,674 
 
Internal Rate of Return 
The model results suggested that the mean IRR would be positive for all water-








Table 65.  IRR  for a 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
10 Year Internal Rate of Return Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 47.96% 12.77% 90.15% 11.96% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 45.79% 10.09% 85.35% 11.87% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 52.28% 14.04% 98.91% 13.09% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
49.94% 11.33% 93.75% 12.97% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 46.62% 11.68% 88.61% 11.90% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
44.46% 9.05% 83.81% 11.81% 
 
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean IRR when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  Confidence 
intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using Tukey’s 
pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 66.   
Table 66.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of IRR confidence intervals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for a 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-2.16%* -2.86% -1.46% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-5.48%* -6.18% -4.78% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-1.34%* -2.04% -0.64% 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-5.66%* -6.36% -4.96% 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-1.34%* -2.04% -0.64% 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
2.34%* 1.64% 3.04% 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
4.32%* 3.62% 5.02% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
4.15%* 3.45% 4.84% 









Percentage of firms with negative NPV and negative IRR 
Based on model results, all firms at the two million oyster per year production 
level had a positive NPV and IRR for all financing scenarios. 
Payback Period 
 The model results suggested that the mean payback period was 3-4 years for all 
water-column operations producing 2,000,000 oysters per year for all financing scenarios 
(Table 67).   
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 
compared using Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 68. 
Table 67.  Payback period for a 2,000.000 oysters per year water-column operation in the Maryland 
Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Year farm gets back to positive cash balance Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 3 2 8 0.71 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 4 2 8 0.76 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 3 2 7 0.68 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 3 2 8 0.71 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 3 2 8 0.77 










Table 68.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of payback period confidence intervals for each source 
of capital with and without nutrient payments for a 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column operation in 
the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and 
confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 





without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.37* 0.33 0.42 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
0.50* 0.45 0.54 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-0.08* -0.12 -0.04 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.22* 0.17 0.26 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-0.37* -0.41 -0.33 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-0.09* -0.13 -0.05 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-0.59* -0.63 -0.54 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





-0.08* -0.13 -0.04 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
As with the one million-oyster production level, the input risk distribution with 
the greatest impact on the mean yearly profit, NPV, and IRR was the price per oyster 
(Appendix A, Figures A-19, A-20, & A-21), followed by survival.   
Two million oysters per year Model Discussion 
Based on the original model assumptions, a 2,000,000 oysters per year operation 
is a viable business investment.  Operations with MARBIDCO financing performed 
better financially than those with other sources of financing due to the interest only 
period and partial principle forgiveness features of the program.  However, there was not 
a significant difference in mean yearly accounting profit between self-finance operations 




 An enterprise budget (Appendix B, Table B-7) was prepared for the total cost 
over the 10-year model simulation for each source of capital with and without nutrient 
payments.  With all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments, costs 
associated with paid employees represented over 60% of the total cost of the operation 
over a ten-year period followed by the cost of seed.  Mean accounting break-even costs 
for each source of capital payments are presented in Table 69.  Break-even prices are 
below the most likely price of $0.55 per oyster and below the range of priced used in the 
model.   
Table 69.  Break-even cost of production for 2,000,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital.   
Mean Accounting Break Even Price over 10 years $ per oyster 
Self-financing $0.26 
MARBIDCO Financing  $0.26 
Conventional Financing  $0.26 
 
Two million five hundred thousand Oysters per year Water-Column Operation 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit 
The model results suggested that the mean yearly accounting profit would be 
positive for all water-column operations producing 2,500,000 oysters per year for all 
financing scenarios (Table 70).   
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean yearly accounting profit when comparing all possible combinations of financing 
scenarios.  Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were 





Table 70.  Yearly accounting profit for a 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Average Yearly Accounting Profit Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $437,607 $110,307 $838,513 $109,262 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $416,203 $91,108 $819,657 $107,793 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$441,717 $114,418 $842,623 $109,262 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$420,314 $95,218 $823,767 $107,793 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$431,670 $104,371 $832,576 $109,262 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$410,267 $85,171 $813,721 $107,793 
 
Table 71.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of yearly accounting profit confidence intervals for each 
source of capital with and without nutrient payments for a 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column 
operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an 
* and confience interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 





without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$21,403* -$27,589 -$15,217 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$10,047* -$16,233 -$3,861 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$5,936 -$12,122 $249 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$10,047* -$16,233 -$3,861 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
-$5,936 -$12,122 $249 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$21,403* $15,217 $27,589 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with 
nutrient payments 
$4,110 -$2,075 $10,296 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 





$21,403* $15,217 $27,589 
Net Present Value 
The model results suggested that the mean NPV would be positive for all water-
column operations producing 2,500,000 oysters per year for all financing scenarios 




An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean NPV when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  
Confidence intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using 
Tukey’s pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 73.   
Table 72.  NPV  for a 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
Net Present Value  Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments $2,574,578 $382,781 $5,260,498 $714,141 
Self-financing without nutrient payments $2,434,648 $257,907 $5,136,055 $704,711 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$2,621,597 $429,800 $5,307,517 $714,141 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$2,481,667 $304,925 $5,183,074 $704,711 
Conventional Financing with nutrient 
payments 
$2,528,382 $336,585 $5,214,302 $714,141 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 
$2,388,451 $211,710 $5,089,858 $704,711 
 
Table 73.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of NPV confidence intervals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrient payments for a 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1 – Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$139,930* -$180,365 -$99,495 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-$93,215* -$133,650 -$52,780 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-$46,196* -$86,631 -$5,761 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-$93,215* -$133,650 -$52,780 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-$46,196* -$86,631 -$5,761 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
$139,930* $99,495 $180,365 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
$47,019* $6,584 $87,454 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
$47,019* $6,584 $87,454 








Internal Rate of Return 
The model results suggested that the mean IRR would be positive for all water-
column operations producing 2,500,000 oysters per year for all financing scenarios 
(Table 74).  
An ANOVA indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 
mean IRR when comparing all possible combinations of financing scenarios.  Confidence 
intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using Tukey’s 
pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 75.   
Table 74.  IRR  for 2,500,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay for 
each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
10 Year Internal Rate of Return Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 55.30% 15.57% 102.81% 12.35% 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 53.11% 13.26% 96.22% 12.24% 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 59.47% 16.92% 111.29% 13.37% 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient 
payments 
57.12% 14.52% 104.18% 13.23% 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 54.12% 14.62% 101.45% 12.29% 
Conventional Financing without nutrient 
payments 













Table 75.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of IRR confidence intervals for each source of capital 
with and without nutrnent payments for a 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 
Confidence Interval Tests 
Scenario 1- Scenario 2 
Difference 




without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-2.19%* -2.91% -1.47% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-5.19%* -5.91% -4.47% 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-1.17%* -1.89% -0.45% 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
-5.35%* -6.07% -4.63% 
Conventional Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-1.18%* -1.90% -0.46% 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
2.35%* 1.63% 3.06% 
MARBIDCO Financing with 
nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
4.17%* 3.45% 4.89% 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
4.02%* 3.30% 4.74% 




2.19%* 1.47% 2.91% 
 
Percentage of firms with negative NPV and negative IRR 
The model results suggested that all water-column operations producing 
2,500,000 oysters per year for all financing scenarios would have a positive mean NPV 
and positive mean IRR. 
Payback Period 
 The model results suggested that the mean payback period would be three-years 
for all water-column operations producing 2,500,000 oysters per year for all financing 
scenarios (Table 76).   
However, due to the differences in the maximum payback periods, an ANOVA 
indicated there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the mean yearly accounting 




intervals of policy relevant financing scenarios pairs were compared using Tukey’s 
pairwise comparison method and are presented in Table 77. 
Table 76.  Payback period for a 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column operation in the Maryland 
Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital with and without nutrient payments. 
 
Table 77.  Results of Tukey’s pairwise comparison of payback period confidence intervals for each source 
of capital with and without nutrient payments for a 2,500,000 oyster per year water-column in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Statistical differcences (p<0.05) in means are marked with an * and confience 
interevals are in bold. 







without nutrient payments 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.28* 0.24 0.31 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
0.36* 0.32 0.39 
Conventional Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-0.14* -0.17 -0.10 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
0.15* 0.12 0.19 
Conventional Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-0.35* -0.38 -0.31 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
-0.07* -0.10 -0.03 
MARBIDCO Financing 
with nutrient payments 
Self-financing with nutrient 
payments 
-0.50* -0.53 -0.46 
MARBIDCO Financing 
without nutrient payments 
Self-financing without 
nutrient payments 
-0.50* -0.53 -0.46 




-0.07* -0.10 -0.03 
 
Year farm gets back to positive cash balance Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Self-financing with nutrient payments 3 2 7 0.56 
Self-financing without nutrient payments 3 2 7 0.59 
MARBIDCO Financing with nutrient payments 3 2 6 0.60 
MARBIDCO Financing without nutrient payments 3 2 7 0.62 
Conventional Financing with nutrient payments 3 2 7 0.65 





The input risk distribution with the greatest impact on the mean yearly profit, 
NPV, and IRR was the price per oyster (Appendix A, Figures A-22, A-23, & A-24), 
followed by survival.   
Two million five hundred thousand oysters per year Model Discussion 
Based on the original model assumptions, a 2,500,000 oysters per year operation 
is a viable business investment.  Operations with MARBIDCO financing performed 
significantly better financially than those with other sources of financing due to the 
interest-only period and partial principle forgiveness features of the program for NPV, 
IRR, and payback period.  However, there was only a significant difference in mean 
yearly accounting profit between conventionally financed operations and those with 
funding from MARBIDCO.  This difference is due to the reduced overall interest expense 
of the MARBIDCO loan program and the partial principle forgiveness.  At this 
production level, the total amount of money financed through debt represents a smaller 
proportion to the overall capital needed to start and operate the operation, resulting in 
debt payments having a smaller impact on accounting profit. 
An enterprise budget (Appendix B, Table B-8) was prepared for the total cost 
over the 10-year model simulation for each source of capital with and without nutrient 
payments.  With all sources of capital with and without nutrient payments, costs 
associated with paid employees represented over 55% of the total cost of the operation 




Mean accounting break-even costs for each source of capital payments are 
presented in Table 78.  Break-even prices are below the most likely price of $0.55 per 
oyster.   
Table 78.  Break-even cost of production for a 2,500,000 oyster per year water-column operation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay for each source of capital. 
Mean Accounting Break Even Price over 10 years $ per oyster 
Self-financing $0.23 
MARBIDCO Financing  $0.23 





Chapter 3:  Summary, Conclusions, and Future Work 
Discussion on the use of debt financing in bottom-culture and water-column 
aquaculture oyster production 
 
As with other types of production agriculture, producing aquacultured oysters is 
financially risky.  Risks may be associated with production such as survival and disease, 
or possibly financial risks such as changes in price, sales, and input costs.  Even with the 
results presented herein, one should always verify input costs and assumptions as each 
operation is unique and physical conditions may be different given that growing areas 
perform differently and all operations have unique financial needs and challenges.  Given 
these risks, this analysis examined the effect of difference sources of capital on the 
success of oyster aquaculture operations in Maryland.   
The use of self-financing to start and fund an operation, along with debt financing 
options were analyzed.  The debt-financing analysis focused on the MARBIDCO 
Maryland Shellfish Loan Program and conventional debt financing from institutions such 
as the Farm Credit System, Wells Fargo, or Bank of America.   
 The interest-only and partial principle forgiveness features of the MARBIDCO 
Loan Program make it an attractive source of funds when compared to using 
conventional loans or using personal funds finance a business.  In all simulations at all 
production scales, firms were more financially successful when MARBIDCO financing 
was used to fund and operate the oyster aquaculture operation rather than when personal 




When comparing sources of debt financing, operations with MARBIDCO 
financing were better off financially, when viewed over a 10-year period, than those 
financed with conventional-lending sources.  The interest-only period of the 
MARBIDCO loan program reduces costs in the early years of the operation while 
businesses are incurring substantial costs but are not able to sell most of their oysters 
since they have not reached market size.  In contrast, the conventional-lending programs 
require principle and interest payments be made during the period before oyster sales 
begin.  The partial principle-forgiveness feature also increases a MARBIDCO funded 
operation’s likelihood of success because it lowers the overall costs of debt service.  It 
should be noted, however, obtaining a loan from MARBIDCO does not guarantee 
success if poor husbandry, or costs of production exceed sales prices.   
One drawback of the MARBIDCO program, expressed by some operators, is the 
large principle and interest payments once the interest-only period has expired.  The large 
payments have the potential to place a financial burden on the operation’s cash flow but 
can be anticipated and managed given input assumptions for the model tend to be slightly 
conservative.  In recent years, MARBDICO has begun to address the issue of large 
principle payments by extending the amortization period for loans with large equipment 
purchases.  Furthermore, they have been willing to negotiate loan terms with borrowers 
should environmental factors result in lower than expected production (Steve McHenry, 
MARBIDCO, personal communication).  In this study, however, operations with 
MARBIDCO financing had shorter payback periods than operations that used 




While not a focus of the study, to determine if there was a difference between 
accounting and economic profit, opportunity costs were calculated based on the foregone 
interest that could have been earned on personal funds used to initially finance the 
modeled operation.  In scenarios where a mix of loans and personal funds were used to 
finance the operation, opportunity costs were calculated on the personal funds that were 
used to start the operation.  Interest was compounded annually based on the ten-year 
Treasury bond rate (2.88% on 8/14/2018).  Operations that utilized self-financing had 
higher opportunity costs than those that used MARBIDCO or conventional lenders for all 
bottom-culture and water-column production levels (Table 79).  Opportunity costs were 
the same for operations utilizing MARBIDCO or conventional lenders since loan 
amounts to start the operations were equal.  At the twenty and one hundred-acre bottom-
culture operation sizes, the opportunity costs were negative, indicating the loan amount 
may have been more than the initial investment.   
Table 79.  Mean opportunity costs for oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
based on model assumptions for initial investment and loan amounts. 





Five-acre bottom-culture operation $18,239 $8,389 $8,389 
Ten-acre bottom-culture operation $18,260 $5,127 $5,127 
Twenty-acre bottom-culture operation $18,236 -$4,748 -$4,748 
One hundred-acre bottom-culture operation $18,350 -$14,484 -$14,484 
Five hundred thousand oysters per year water-column 
operation 
$46,197 $13,363 $13,363 
One million oyster per year water-column operation $69,478 $36,644 $36,644 
Two million oyster per year water-column operation $115,757 $82,923 $82,923 
Two million five hundred thousand oyster per year 
water-column operation 






Discussion on nutrient payments  
 
When operations received nutrient payments, financial indicators were greater 
than when the same operations did not receive nutrient payments.  In the study it was 
assumed there was no additional cost associated with participating in a nutrient-payment 
program or the cost of participating in the program was deducted from any payment 
received, resulting in net positive payment.  This assumptions was made following the 
rational in Weber et al. (2018). While nutrient credits represent a small percentage of 
income (2-4%) compared to aquaculture oyster sales, based on enterprise budgets found 
in Appendix B, the addition of nutrient payments could have the potential to provide 
substantial amounts of income, as nutrient credit payments are based on production.  For 
example, the model results suggest over a ten-year period a one-hundred acre bottom-
culture operation and a 2,500,000 oyster per year water-column operation could receive 
$472,577 and $235,453 respectively (Appendix B, Tables B-4 and B-8).  As mentioned 
previously receiving nutrient credit payments had a positive effect on operation success, 
and could potentially be used as a way to improve profitability should an unexpected loss 
occur to a portion of the oysters grown on the lease. 
Bottom-culture Aquaculture Conclusions 
 
In this study, the model results suggest there are economies of scale for the 
bottom-culture of aquaculture oysters in Maryland.  Using the production estimates from 
the operations sizes analyzed in this study and examining self-financed operations, to 




bushels harvested from the representative lease sizes increased the break-even price per 
bushel decreased (Figure 11).   
Figure 11.  Break-even price per bushel for self-financed bottom-culture operations for oyster aquaculture 
in the Chesapeake without nutrient payments with model assumptions for labor. 
  Operators should carefully consider the costs of inputs, which affect the break-
even price of the operation, especially regarding the amount and type of labor used.  For 
example, the mean yearly accounting profit for a five-acre, self-financed, bottom-culture 
operation without nutrient payments was -$31,718, while a self-financed, one-hundred-
acre, bottom-culture operation without nutrient payments was $901,533 (Figure 12) using 




















Break-even price for self-finaced bottom-culture operations without 





Figure 12.  Mean yearly accounting profit for all bottom-culture production levels, different sources of 
capital, for oyster aquaculture in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay with and without nutrient payments. 
When examining NPV for operations of different production scales, the same 
trend was seen as production scale increased (Figure 13).  As expected, larger operations 
were more profitable with a greater NPV than smaller operations.  The model suggests 
smaller operations may not be a profitable investment, however, if operation are able to 
lower costs, especially in respect to labor, it may be possible for them to achieve a 
positive NPV 
There was also a reduction in the percentage of operations with a negative NPV 































Mean yearly accounting profit of bottom-culture aquacutlure 
operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay




Figure 13.  Mean NPV for oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay for all bottom-
culture production levels, sources of capital, with and without nutrient payments. 
Figure 14.  Percentage oyster aquaculture operations with negative NPV and IRR in the Maryland 
Chesapeake Bay for all bottom-culture production levels, sources of capital, with and without nutrient 
payments.  One hundred-acre bottom-culture operations all had a positive NPV and IRR.  Note the 
percentage of operations with a negative NPV and negative IRR for the 20-acre operations were less than 
1% and do not show up due to scale. 
Some operations with smaller leases may view their operation as supplemental 
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Chesapeake Bay with negative NPV and IRR




unpaid family labor due to the small area harvested each year.  A simulation was 
performed to determine the difference between the mean yearly accounting profit, NPV, 
IRR, and percentage of operations with negative NPV & IRR from the original model 
and one where unpaid family labor was used (Table 80).  There was a significant 
difference in the average yearly accounting profit, NPV, IRR for five, ten, and twenty-
acre operations.  The difference in percentage of operations with a negative NPV and 
IRR was only significant at the five and ten-acre sized operations.  If an operation is 
small enough to operate as supplemental income with unpaid family labor, this strategy 
represents a way for small leases to be profitable operations. 
Table 80.  Comparison of the effects of unpaid family labor on self-financed bottom-culture aquaculture 
operations not receiving nutrient payments in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  Significant differences are 
marked with an *. 





No Labor Costs 
Mean 
Five Acre -$31,713* $34,316* 
Ten-Acre $12,911* $79,270* 
Twenty-Acre $103,268* $168,884* 
Mean NPV     
Five Acre -$244,133* $192,064* 
Ten-Acre $38,552* $473,551* 
Twenty-Acre $601,672* $1,035,093* 
Mean IRR     
Five Acre -27.04%* 42.42%* 
Ten-Acre 13.64%* 67.76%* 
Twenty-Acre 58.12%* 98.26%* 
Percentage of operations with negative NPV & IRR     
Five Acre 100.00%* 0.00%* 
Ten-Acre 31.64%* 0.00%* 





Sensitivity analysis consistently indicated that the price per bushel had a large 
impact on the mean yearly accounting profit, NPV, and IRR of operations across all 
production levels despite the funding source.  There is little an operation can do to 
influence the market price for oysters.  However, some smaller-sized operators may try 
increasing the number of single oysters they produce for the half-shell market by 
“working” areas of their lease more often (i.e., pulling a bag-less dredge across areas of 
the lease to breakup oyster clumps).  Alternatively, other options include actively sizing, 
washing, and boxing the harvest to present a more attractive product or selling their crop 
at venues such as local farmers markets where higher prices can be obtained for fresh 
shellfish are possible.   
A simulation was performed to determine if doubling the amount of oysters sold 
to the half-shell market would have a significant effect on the mean yearly accounting 
profit, NPV, IRR and number of operations with a negative NPV and IRR on operations 
with smaller leases (Table 81).  While there was a significant increase in the financial 
metrics for five, ten, and twenty-acre operations, the mean yearly accounting profit, NPV, 
and IRR was still negative for the five-acre operation.  This finding indicates simply 
doubling the percentage of single oysters sold to the half-shell market, without reducing 
production costs per oyster, will not ensure the financial success of the smallest of 
operations.  Assuming the same bushel per acre production level, operations at the ten 
and twenty-acre size had a positive mean yearly accounting profit with the original model 





Table 81.  Comparison of the effects of doubling sales to the half-shell market on self-financed bottom-
culture aquaculture operations not receiving nutrient payments in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay.  
Significant differences are marked with an *. 







Five Acre -$31,713* -$23,936* 
Ten-Acre $12,911* $28,545* 
Twenty-Acre $103,268* $134,259* 
Mean NPV     
Five Acre -$244,133* -194,630* 
Ten-Acre $38,552* $134,526* 
Twenty-Acre $601,672* $797,837* 
Mean IRR     
Five Acre -27.04% -14.49% 
Ten-Acre 13.64%* 24.37%* 
Twenty-Acre 58.12%* 69.43%* 
Percentage of operations with negative NPV & IRR     
Five Acre 100.00% 98.38% 
Ten-Acre 31.64% 12.86%* 
Twenty-Acre 0.04% 0.00% 
 
Water-column Aquaculture Conclusions 
As with the bottom-culture analysis, it was determined that there were economies 
of scale for water-column production of aquaculture oysters in the Maryland Chesapeake 
Bay.  By examining self-financed operations without nutrient payments, as production 
increased, the break-even price per oyster decreased (Figure 15).   
Special attention should be paid to the costs of inputs that affect the break-even 
price of the operation, especially regarding the amount and type of labor used.  Labor 
hour estimates in this analysis were based on a survey of aquaculture producers in the 
state of Virginia (Hudson et al., 2012). There is, however, no comprehensive information 
on the amount of labor used in the Maryland aquaculture industry.  Some smaller 




analysis, or to forgo an owner’s salary if they have other sources of income.  Ted Cooney 
of Madhouse Oysters stated once, “It’s been seven years, and I have yet to draw a salary 
from my oyster operations.  I pay my employees, but luckily have another source of 
income for now.”   
A simulation was performed for a self-financed, 500,000 oysters per year water-
column operation that did not receiving nutrient payments to compare different labor 
management options.  In the first simulation, general labor was reduced by 50% of the 
labor used in the original simulation.  A second simulation was completed in which the 
effects of paying employees the original estimated labor amount, but without 
supervisory-owner salary (Table 82).  Results indicate there was a significant difference 
in the mean yearly accounting profit, NPV, IRR, percentage of operations with negative 
NPV and IRR, and the payback period when labor costs were reduced by half.  This 
infers reducing the general labor needed, possibly combined with the owner not drawing 
a salary, and could be one management strategy to help smaller water-column oyster 
operations to be profitable so they may build capital to expand production in the future.  
With both of these alternate strategies examined, there were still a high percentage of 
operations with a negative NPV and IRR.  This result indicates, even with reduced labor 
costs, a 500,000 oyster per year water-column operation is a risky business investment, 
however if an operation receives payments for nutrient credits, they can help increase the 
chances of a positive NPV and positive IRR.   
As seen in the analysis of bottom-culture operations, when the production scale 
increased, so did the value of the financial indicators.  The mean yearly accounting profit 




financed operation without nutrient payments, while in comparison, a 2.5 million oysters 
harvested per year farm with the same source of capital was $416,203 (Figure 16).  This 
trend was true for all sources of capital, with and without nutrient payments.  When 
examining NPV for operations of different production scales, as production scale 
increased (Figure 17) so did the NPV.   
Figure 15.  Break-even price per oyster harvested for self-financed water-column culture operations 
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Table 82.  Comparison of the effects of reduced labor estimates on a self-financed, 500,000 oysters 
harvested per year water-column aquaculture operation not receiving nutrient payments in the Maryland 








No Owner Salary 
Mean Yearly Accounting Profit -$39,595* $18,608*  $6,966* 
Mean NPV -$356,650* $31,990* -$39,703* 
Mean IRR -12.61%* 10.09%* 5.08%* 
Percent of operations with negative NPV and IRR 98.78%* 39.88%* 55.88%* 
Mean Payback Period >10 years* 7* 8* 
 
Figure 16.  Mean yearly accounting profit for all water-column production levels, sources of capital, with 
and without nutrient payments in Maryland, Chesapeake Bay. 
Sensitivity analysis consistently indicated that the price per oyster had a large 
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across all production levels.  As mentioned previously an aquaculture operation has 
limited influenced on the price of oysters they sell. 
Figure 17.  Mean NPV for all water-column culture production levels, sources of capital, with and without 
nutrient payments in theMaryland, Chesapeake Bay. 
Overall Conclusion 
 
Overall, the results of this analysis indicate that, MARBIDCO financing improves 
operation success by increasing financial returns across all levels of production.  There 
was a clear economy of size before break-even profits were realized (Figure 11 &, Figure 
15).  Yet, increasing the production level is a “doubled-edged sword” because as 
production scale increases so does the amount of capital needed.  Many potential entrants 
to this industry may not have the needed capital to start their operation and have no other 
choice than to utilize some form of debt financing.  Those operations participating in the 
MARBIDCO Maryland Shellfish Aquaculture Loan fund would benefit financially when 
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Further, many conventional lending sources may not lend money to aquaculture 
operations due to the high risk involved, or a lack of understanding of the industry.   
On a positive note, as the industry has grown, there has been an increased interest 
in lending to shellfish aquaculture operations from conventional lending sources (Andrew 
Rose, MidAtlantic Farm Credit, personal communication).  Still, conventional lending for 
aquaculture is still not as readily available as with traditional land-based agricultural 
operations.   
The MARBIDCO program has and will continue to play an important role in 
eliminating challenges in obtaining capital for aquaculture operations in Maryland.  
Clearly, operations in the program are better off financially than those operations 
obtaining financing from conventional funding sources.   
Future Work 
 
As seen in the ten-year enterprise budgets (Appendix B) one of the major factors 
influencing the financial success of any oyster aquaculture operation in the state of 
Maryland are costs associated with labor.  As production levels increase, so does the 
amount of labor needed.  As a result, many farms are looking for ways to mechanize parts 
of the production process or reduce overall labor costs in both bottom-culture and water-
column oyster culture.  Future studies should examine the costs of labor as different types 
of equipment are designed and implemented.  For bottom-culture and water-column 
culture operations, a detailed analysis of labor usage in the Maryland aquaculture 




As mechanisms for a  nutrient trading marketplace are completed, and more 
oyster BMPs are approved for nutrient removal, further analysis should be undertaken to 
complement the analysis performed by Weber et al.  (2018) to determine the effects of 
nutrient trading on farm profitability. 
Concerning financing oyster aquaculture operations, more research is needed on 
the effects of combining financing sources.  For example, an operation may borrow 
money from MARBIDCO to get started and then refinance the remaining principle after 
the interest-only period has expired with a conventional lender.  This approach could 
stretch principle payments out over a longer period.  While possibly increasing the 
overall cost of debt financing, the effects of refinancing the remaining principle on farm 
cash flow should be explored and compared with self-financed operations.  Additionally, 
it should be determined how long an owner could realistically go without a paid salary as 
the operation grows before the operation fails.  
Many growers expect a catastrophic mortality event to affect their farms at least 
once every ten years as a result of severe weather or increased prevalence of diseases.  By 
all accounts 2018, was an unusually wet year for the Chesapeake Bay watershed and the 
effects on oysters growing in the Chesapeake Bay are still to be determined 
(Smedinghoff, 2018).  As the model is refined, catastrophic mortality events should be 






























Figure A-1.  Sensitivity Analysis for average yearly accounting profit for five-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not 
















































Percentage Of Oysters Sold To Half Shell Market
Year 6 / Yearly Survival Factor
Year 3 / Yearly Survival Factor
Year 9 / Yearly Survival Factor
Year 5 / Yearly Survival Factor
Year 8 / Yearly Survival Factor
Year 4 / Yearly Survival Factor
Year 7 / Yearly Survival Factor
Harvest Vessel w/ dredge / Cost Per Unit
AverageYearly Economic Profit
Self-Financing without nutrient payments AverageYearly Economic Profit








Figure A-2.  Sensitivity Analysis for NPV for five-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient payments in the 
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Figure A-3.  Sensitivity Analysis for IRR for five-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient payments in the 
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Figure A-4.  Sensitivity Analysis for average yearly accounting profit for ten-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not 
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Figure A-5.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean NPV for ten-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient payments 
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Figure A-6.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean IRR for ten-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient payments in 
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Figure A-7.  Sensitivity Analysis for average yearly accounting profit for twenty-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not 
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Figure A-8.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean NPV for twenty-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient 
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Figure A-9.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean IRR for twenty-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient 
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Figure A-10.  Sensitivity Analysis for average yearly accounting profit for one hundred-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing 
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Figure A-11.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean NPV for one hundred-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient 
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Figure A-12.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean IRR for one hundred-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient 
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Figure A-13.  Sensitivity Analysis for average yearly accounting profit for 500,000 oysters per year water-column oyster aquaculture operation with private 
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Figure A-14.  Sensitivity Analysis mean NPV for 500,000 oysters per year water-column oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving 
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Figure A-15.  Sensitivity Analysis mean IRR for 500,000 oysters per year water-column oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving 
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Figure A-16.  Sensitivity Analysis for average yearly accounting profit for 1,000,000 oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient 
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Figure A-17.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean NPV for 1,000,000 oysters per year water-column oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving 
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Figure A-18.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean IRR for 1,000,000 oysters per year water-column oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving 
nutrient payments in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Baseline = 17.574%
-5
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Figure A-19.  Sensitivity Analysis for average yearly accounting profit for 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column oyster aquaculture operation with private 
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Figure A-20.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean NPV for 2,000,000 oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient payments in the 
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Figure A-21.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean IRR for 2,000,000 oysters per year water-column oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving 
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Figure A-22.  Sensitivity Analysis for average yearly accounting profit for 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column operation with private financing not 
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Figure A-23.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean NPV for 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column oyster aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving 
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Figure A-24.  Sensitivity Analysis for mean IRR for 2,500,000 oysters per year water-column aquaculture operation with private financing not receiving nutrient 
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Item Total $ % of Income Total $ % of Income Total $ % of Income Total $ % of Income Total $ % of Income Total $ % of Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 145,961$            23.53% 145,961$        24.47% 145,961$     23.53% 145,961$           24.47% 145,961$     23.53% 145,961$     24.47%
Bushel Oyster Markets 450,585$            72.65% 450,585$        75.53% 450,585$     72.65% 450,585$           75.53% 450,585$     72.65% 450,585$     75.53%
Total Nutrient Payments 23,668$              3.82% 23,668$       3.82% 23,668$       3.82%




Total Cost Total $
Percentage Of 
Total Cost Total $
Percentage Of Total 
Cost Total $
Percentage Of 
Total Cost Total $
Percentage Of 
Total Cost Total $
Percentage Of Total 
Cost
Spat on Shell 92,400$              9.78% 92,400$         9.78% 92,400$       9.69% 92,400$             9.69% 92,400$       9.65% 92,400$       9.65%
Labor
General Labor 297,500$            31.48% 297,500$        31.48% 297,500$     31.20% 297,500$           31.20% 297,500$     31.08% 297,500$     31.08%
Supervisory Labor 320,000$            33.86% 320,000$        33.86% 320,000$     33.55% 320,000$           33.55% 320,000$     33.43% 320,000$     33.43%
Unemployment Insurance Ta 16,055$              1.70% 16,055$         1.70% 16,055$       1.68% 16,055$             1.68% 16,055$       1.68% 16,055$       1.68%
FICA 38,285$              4.05% 38,285$         4.05% 38,285$       4.01% 38,285$             4.01% 38,285$       4.00% 38,285$       4.00%
Workman's Comp 30,875$              3.27% 30,875$         3.27% 30,875$       3.24% 30,875$             3.24% 30,875$       3.23% 30,875$       3.23%
Fuel 33,420$              3.52% 33,420$         3.52% 33,420$       3.49% 33,420$             3.49% 33,420$       3.48% 33,420$       3.48%
Monitoring 4,326$               0.46% 4,326$           0.46% 4,326$         0.45% 4,326$              0.45% 4,326$         0.45% 4,326$         0.45%
Retail Containers 3,138$               0.33% 3,138$           0.33% 3,138$         0.33% 3,138$              0.33% 3,138$         0.33% 3,138$         0.33%
Marketing Expenses 4,005$               0.42% 4,005$           0.42% 4,005$         0.42% 4,005$              0.42% 4,005$         0.42% 4,005$         0.42%
Overhead 25,200$              2.67% 25,200$         2.67% 25,200$       2.64% 25,200$             2.64% 25,200$       2.63% 25,200$       2.63%
Total Variable Costs 865,205$            91.54% 865,205$        91.54% 865,205$     90.71% 865,205$           90.71% 865,205$     90.36% 865,205$     90.36%
Fixed Costs
Total $ Total $ Total $ Total $ Total $ Total $
Insurance 22,830$              2.42% 22,830$         2.42% 22,830$       2.39% 22,830$             2.39% 22,830$       2.38% 22,830$       2.38%
Lease Fees 175$                  0.02% 175$              0.02% 175$           0.02% 175$                 0.02% 175$           0.02% 175$           0.02%
Permit Fees -$                  0.00% -$              0.00% -$            0.00% -$                 0.00% -$            0.00% -$            0.00%
Repairs 1,625$               0.17% 1,625$           0.17% 1,625$         0.17% 1,625$              0.17% 1,625$         0.17% 1,625$         0.17%
Conventional Loan Payments -$                  0.00% -$              0.00% -$            0.00% -$                 0.00% 12,287$       1.28% 12,287$       1.28%
MARBIDCO Loan Payments -$                  0.00% -$              0.00% 8,639$         0.91% 8,639$              0.91% -$            0.00% -$            0.00%
Depreciation 55,549$              5.86% 55,549$         5.86% 55,549$       5.80% 55,549$             5.80% 55,549$       5.78% 55,549$       5.78%
Total Fixed Cost 80,179$              8.46% 80,179$         8.46% 88,818$       9.29% 88,818$             9.29% 92,465$       9.64% 92,465$       9.64%
-$              
Total Costs 945,384$            100.00% 945,384$        100.00% 954,022$     100.00% 954,022$           100.00% 957,670$     100.00% 957,670$     100.00%
Income Before Taxes (325,169)$           (348,838)$      (333,808)$    (357,476)$          (337,456)$    (361,124)$    
Private Funds with 
Nutrient Payments
Private Funds without 
Nutrient Payments

















Table B-1.  Enterprise budgets for five-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Gross Income
 Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 146,178$        23.61% 146,178$        24.54% 146,178$        23.61% 146,178$        24.54% 146,178$        23.61% 146,178$        24.54%
Bushel Oyster Markets 449,414$        72.60% 449,414$        75.46% 449,414$        72.60% 449,414$        75.46% 449,414$        72.60% 449,414$        75.46%
Total Nutrient Payments 23,472$          3.79% 0.00% 23,472$          3.79% 0.00% 23,472$          3.79% 0.00%
Total Gross Income 619,065$        100% 595,593$        100% 619,065$        1.0$         595,593$        1.0$         619,065$        100% 595,593$        100%
Variable Cost
 Total $ 
% of 
Total 
Cost  Total $ 
% of 
Total 
Cost  Total $ 
% of 
Total 
Cost  Total $ 
% of 
Total 
Cost  Total $ 
% of 
Total 




Spat on Shell 92,400$          10.38% 92,400$          10.28% 92,400$          9.34% 92,400$          10.28% 92,400$          10.24% 92,400$          10.24%
Labor
General Labor 297,500$        33.43% 297,500$        33.11% 297,500$        30.06% 297,500$        33.11% 297,500$        32.98% 297,500$        32.98%
Supervisory Labor 320,000$        35.96% 320,000$        35.61% 320,000$        32.33% 320,000$        35.61% 320,000$        35.47% 320,000$        35.47%
Unemployment Insurance Tax 16,055$          1.80% 16,055$          1.79% 16,055$          1.62% 16,055$          1.79% 16,055$          1.78% 16,055$          1.78%
FICA 38,285$          4.30% 38,285$          4.26% 38,285$          3.87% 38,285$          4.26% 38,285$          4.24% 38,285$          4.24%
Workman's Comp 30,875$          3.47% 30,875$          3.44% 30,875$          3.12% 30,875$          3.44% 30,875$          3.42% 30,875$          3.42%
Fuel 33,459$          3.76% 33,459$          3.72% 33,459$          3.37% 33,459$          3.72% 33,459$          3.71% 33,459$          3.71%
Monitoring 4,302$            0.48% 4,302$            0.48% 4,302$            0.44% 4,302$            0.48% 4,302$            0.48% 4,302$            0.48%
Retail Containers 3,138$            0.35% 3,138$            0.35% 3,138$            0.32% 3,138$            0.35% 3,138$            0.35% 3,138$            0.35%
Marketing Expenses 4,016$            0.45% 4,016$            0.45% 4,016$            0.40% 4,016$            0.45% 4,016$            0.45% 4,016$            0.45%
Overhead 25,201$          2.83% 25,201$          2.80% 25,201$          2.55% 25,201$          2.80% 25,201$          2.79% 25,201$          2.79%
Total Variable Costs 865,230$        97.23% 865,230$        96.30% 865,230$        87.42% 865,230$        96.30% 865,230$        95.91% 865,230$        95.91%
Fixed Costs
 Total $ 
% of 
Total 
Cost  Total $ 
% of 
Total 
Cost  Total $ 
% of 
Total 
Cost  Total $ 
% of 
Total 
Cost  Total $ 
% of 
Total 




Insurance 22,830$          2.57% 22,830$          2.54% 22,830$          2.31% 22,830$          2.54% 22,830$          2.53% 22,830$          2.53%
Lease Fees 175$               0.02% 175$               0.02% 175$               0.02% 175$               0.02% 175$               0.02% 175$               0.02%
Repairs 1,625$            0.18% 1,625$            0.18% 1,625$            0.16% 1,625$            0.18% 1,625$            0.18% 1,625$            0.18%
Conventional Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 12,287$          1.36% 12,287$          1.36%
MARBIDCO Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.96% 8,639$            4.51% 8,639$            0.96% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Total Fixed Cost 24,630$          2.77% 33,269$          3.70% 8,639$            12.58% 33,269$          3.70% 36,917$          4.09% 36,917$          4.09%
Total Costs 889,861$        100.00% 898,499$        100.00% 873,869$        100.00% 898,499$        100.00% 902,147$        100.00% 902,147$        100.00%






 Personal Funds with 
Nutrient Payments 















Table B-2.  Enterprise budget for ten-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Gross Income
 Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 294,405$        23.74% 294,405$        24.68% 294,405$        23.74% 294,405$        23.74% 294,405$        23.74% 294,405$        24.68%
Bushel Oyster Markets 898,640$        72.46% 898,640$        75.32% 898,640$        72.46% 898,640$        72.46% 898,640$        72.46% 898,640$        75.32%
Total Nutrient Payments 47,165$          3.80% 0.00% 47,165$          3.80% 47,165$          3.80% 47,165$          3.80% 0.00%





















Spat on Shell 184,800$        18.67% 184,800$        18.67% 184,800$        18.44% 184,800$        18.44% 184,800$        18.33% 184,800$        18.33%
Labor
General Labor 297,500$        30.05% 297,500$        30.05% 297,500$        29.68% 297,500$        29.68% 297,500$        29.51% 297,500$        29.51%
Supervisory Labor 320,000$        32.32% 320,000$        32.32% 320,000$        31.93% 320,000$        31.93% 320,000$        31.74% 320,000$        31.74%
Unemployment Insurance Tax 16,055$          1.62% 16,055$          1.62% 16,055$          1.60% 16,055$          1.60% 16,055$          1.59% 16,055$          1.59%
FICA 38,285$          3.87% 38,285$          3.87% 38,285$          3.82% 38,285$          3.82% 38,285$          3.80% 38,285$          3.80%
Workman's Comp 30,875$          3.12% 30,875$          3.12% 30,875$          3.08% 30,875$          3.08% 30,875$          3.06% 30,875$          3.06%
Fuel 33,371$          3.37% 33,371$          3.37% 33,371$          3.33% 33,371$          3.33% 33,371$          3.31% 33,371$          3.31%
Monitoring 4,322$            0.44% 4,322$            0.44% 4,322$            0.43% 4,322$            0.43% 4,322$            0.43% 4,322$            0.43%
Retail Containers 6,336$            0.64% 6,336$            0.64% 6,336$            0.63% 6,336$            0.63% 6,336$            0.63% 6,336$            0.63%
Marketing Expenses 3,991$            0.40% 3,991$            0.40% 3,991$            0.40% 3,991$            0.40% 3,991$            0.40% 3,991$            0.40%
Overhead 28,066$          2.83% 28,066$          2.83% 28,066$          2.80% 28,066$          2.80% 28,066$          2.78% 28,066$          2.78%





















Insurance 23,499$          2.37% 23,499$          2.37% 23,499$          2.34% 23,499$          2.34% 23,499$          2.33% 23,499$          2.33%
Lease Fees 350$               0.04% 350$               0.04% 350$               0.03% 350$               0.03% 350$               0.03% 350$               0.03%
Repairs 2,609$            0.26% 2,609$            0.26% 2,609$            0.26% 2,609$            0.26% 2,609$            0.26% 2,609$            0.26%
Conventional Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 18,202$          1.81% 18,202$          1.81%
MARBIDCO Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 12,238$          1.22% 12,238$          1.22% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Total Fixed Cost 26,458$          2.67% 26,458$          2.67% 38,696$          3.86% 38,696$          3.86% 44,660$          4.43% 44,660$          4.43%
Total Costs 990,059$        100.00% 990,059$        100.00% 1,002,296$     100.00% 1,002,296$     100.00% 1,008,261$     100.00% 1,008,261$     100.00%




 Personal Funds with 
Nutrient Payments 
 Personal Funds without 
Nutrient Payments 
















Table B-3.  Enterprise budget for twenty-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Gross Income
 Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 583,933$        23.52% 583,933$        24.46% 583,933$        23.52% 583,933$        24.46% 583,933$        23.52% 583,933$        24.46%
Bushel Oyster Markets 1,803,492$     72.64% 1,803,492$     75.54% 1,803,492$     72.64% 1,803,492$     75.54% 1,803,492$     72.64% 1,803,492$     75.54%
Total Nutrient Payments 95,403$          3.84% -$               0.00% 95,403$          3.84% 0.00% 95,403$          3.84% 0.00%





















Spat on Shell 369,600$        30.90% 369,600$        30.90% 369,600$        30.34% 369,600$        30.34% 369,600$        30.05% 369,600$        30.05%
Labor
General Labor 297,500$        24.88% 297,500$        24.88% 297,500$        24.42% 297,500$        24.42% 297,500$        24.19% 297,500$        24.19%
Supervisory Labor 320,000$        26.76% 320,000$        26.76% 320,000$        26.27% 320,000$        26.27% 320,000$        26.01% 320,000$        26.01%
Unemployment Insurance Tax 16,055$          1.34% 16,055$          1.34% 16,055$          1.32% 16,055$          1.32% 16,055$          1.31% 16,055$          1.31%
FICA 38,285$          3.20% 38,285$          3.20% 38,285$          3.14% 38,285$          3.14% 38,285$          3.11% 38,285$          3.11%
Workman's Comp 30,875$          2.58% 30,875$          2.58% 30,875$          2.53% 30,875$          2.53% 30,875$          2.51% 30,875$          2.51%
Fuel 33,491$          2.80% 33,491$          2.80% 33,491$          2.75% 33,491$          2.75% 33,491$          2.72% 33,491$          2.72%
Monitoring 4,373$            0.37% 4,373$            0.37% 4,373$            0.36% 4,373$            0.36% 4,373$            0.36% 4,373$            0.36%
Retail Containers 12,528$          1.05% 12,528$          1.05% 12,528$          1.03% 12,528$          1.03% 12,528$          1.02% 12,528$          1.02%
Marketing Expenses 4,041$            0.34% 4,041$            0.34% 4,041$            0.33% 4,041$            0.33% 4,041$            0.33% 4,041$            0.33%
Overhead 33,802$          2.83% 33,802$          2.83% 33,802$          2.77% 33,802$          2.77% 33,802$          2.75% 33,802$          2.75%





















Insurance 30,106$          2.52% 30,106$          2.52% 30,106$          2.47% 30,106$          2.47% 30,106$          2.45% 30,106$          2.45%
Lease Fees 700$               0.06% 700$               0.06% 700$               0.06% 700$               0.06% 700$               0.06% 700$               0.06%
Repairs 4,578$            0.38% 4,578$            0.38% 4,578$            0.38% 4,578$            0.38% 4,578$            0.37% 4,578$            0.37%
Conventional Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 34,129$          2.77% 34,129$          2.77%
MARBIDCO Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 22,316$          1.83% 22,316$          1.83% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Total Fixed Cost 35,384$          2.96% 35,384$          2.96% 57,700$          4.74% 57,700$          4.74% 69,513$          5.65% 69,513$          5.65%
Total Costs 1,195,934$     100.00% 1,195,934$     100.00% 1,218,250$     100.00% 1,218,250$     100.00% 1,230,063$     100.00% 1,230,063$     100.00%







 Personal Funds with 
Nutrient Payments 
 Personal Funds without 
Nutrient Payments 













Table B-4.  Enterprise budget for one-hundred-acre bottom-culture oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Gross Income
 Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 2,971,777$     23.94% 2,971,777$     24.88% 2,971,777$     23.94% 2,971,777$     24.88% 2,971,777$     23.94% 2,971,777$     24.88%
Bushel Oyster Markets 8,970,351$     72.26% 8,970,351$     75.12% 8,970,351$     72.26% 8,970,351$     75.12% 8,970,351$     72.26% 8,970,351$     75.12%
Total Nutrient Payments 472,577$        3.81% -$               0.00% 472,577$        3.81% 0.00% 472,577$        3.81% 0.00%





















Spat on Shell 1,848,000$     64.78% 1,848,000$     64.78% 1,848,000$     63.90% 1,848,000$     63.90% 1,848,000$     63.27% 1,848,000$     63.27%
Labor
General Labor 297,500$        10.43% 297,500$        10.43% 297,500$        10.29% 297,500$        10.29% 297,500$        10.19% 297,500$        10.19%
Supervisory Labor 320,000$        11.22% 320,000$        11.22% 320,000$        11.06% 320,000$        11.06% 320,000$        10.96% 320,000$        10.96%
Unemployment Insurance Tax 16,055$          0.56% 16,055$          0.56% 16,055$          0.56% 16,055$          0.56% 16,055$          0.55% 16,055$          0.55%
FICA 38,285$          1.34% 38,285$          1.34% 38,285$          1.32% 38,285$          1.32% 38,285$          1.31% 38,285$          1.31%
Workman's Comp 30,875$          1.08% 30,875$          1.08% 30,875$          1.07% 30,875$          1.07% 30,875$          1.06% 30,875$          1.06%
Fuel 32,971$          1.16% 32,971$          1.16% 32,971$          1.14% 32,971$          1.14% 32,971$          1.13% 32,971$          1.13%
Monitoring 4,319$            0.15% 4,319$            0.15% 4,319$            0.15% 4,319$            0.15% 4,319$            0.15% 4,319$            0.15%
Retail Containers 63,613$          2.23% 63,613$          2.23% 63,613$          2.20% 63,613$          2.20% 63,613$          2.18% 63,613$          2.18%
Marketing Expenses 4,009$            0.14% 4,009$            0.14% 4,009$            0.14% 4,009$            0.14% 4,009$            0.14% 4,009$            0.14%
Overhead 79,669$          2.79% 79,669$          2.79% 79,669$          2.75% 79,669$          2.75% 79,669$          2.73% 79,669$          2.73%





















Insurance 93,444$          3.28% 93,444$          3.28% 93,444$          3.23% 93,444$          3.23% 93,444$          3.20% 93,444$          3.20%
Lease Fees 3,500$            0.12% 3,500$            0.12% 3,500$            0.12% 3,500$            0.12% 3,500$            0.12% 3,500$            0.12%
Repairs 20,326$          0.71% 20,326$          0.71% 20,326$          0.70% 20,326$          0.70% 20,326$          0.70% 20,326$          0.70%
Conventional Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 68,259$          2.34% 68,259$          2.34%
MARBIDCO Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 39,592$          1.37% 39,592$          1.37% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Total Fixed Cost 117,270$        4.11% 117,270$        4.11% 156,862$        5.42% 156,862$        5.42% 185,529$        6.35% 185,529$        6.35%
Total Costs 2,852,566$     100.00% 2,852,566$     100.00% 2,892,158$     100.00% 2,892,158$     100.00% 2,920,825$     100.00% 2,920,825$     100.00%







 Personal Funds with 
Nutrient Payments 
 Personal Funds without 
Nutrient Payments 













Table B-5.  Enterprise budget for 500,000 oyster per year water-column culture oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Gross Income
 Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 1,883,867$     97.60% 1,883,867$     100.00% 1,883,867$     97.60% 1,883,867$     100.00% 1,883,867$     97.60% 1,883,867$     100.00%
Bushel Oyster Markets -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Total Nutrient Payments 46,383$          2.40% -$               0.00% 46,383$          2.40% -$               0.00% 46,383$          2.40% -$               0.00%





















Seed 170,000$        7.67% 170,000$        7.80% 170,000$        7.71% 170,000$        7.71% 170,000$        7.66% 170,000$        7.66%
Labor
General Labor 1,051,668$     47.47% 1,051,668$     48.27% 1,051,668$     47.69% 1,051,668$     47.69% 1,051,668$     47.38% 1,051,668$     47.38%
Supervisory Labor 416,000$        18.78% 416,000$        19.09% 416,000$        18.87% 416,000$        18.87% 416,000$        18.74% 416,000$        18.74%
Worker's Comp 73,383$          3.31% 73,383$          3.37% 73,383$          3.33% 73,383$          3.33% 73,383$          3.31% 73,383$          3.31%
FICA 90,995$          4.11% 90,995$          4.18% 90,995$          4.13% 90,995$          4.13% 90,995$          4.10% 90,995$          4.10%
Unemployment Insurance 38,159$          1.72% 38,159$          1.75% 38,159$          1.73% 38,159$          1.73% 38,159$          1.72% 38,159$          1.72%
Fuel 33,262$          1.50% 33,262$          1.53% 33,262$          1.51% 33,262$          1.51% 33,262$          1.50% 33,262$          1.50%
Monitoring 9,901$            0.45% 9,901$            0.45% 9,901$            0.45% 9,901$            0.45% 9,901$            0.45% 9,901$            0.45%
Retail Containers 38,995$          1.76% 38,995$          1.79% 38,995$          1.77% 38,995$          1.77% 38,995$          1.76% 38,995$          1.76%
Marketing Expenses 31,658$          1.43% 31,658$          1.45% 31,658$          1.44% 31,658$          1.44% 31,658$          1.43% 31,658$          1.43%
Cages Purchased 45,190$          2.04% 45,190$          2.07% 45,190$          2.05% 45,190$          2.05% 45,190$          2.04% 45,190$          2.04%
Mesh Bags Purchased 15,012$          0.68% 15,012$          0.69% 15,012$          0.68% 15,012$          0.68% 15,012$          0.68% 15,012$          0.68%
Overhead 60,427$          2.73% 60,427$          2.77% 60,427$          2.74% 60,427$          2.74% 60,427$          2.72% 60,427$          2.72%





















Insurance 98,773$          4.46% 98,773$          4.53% 98,773$          4.48% 98,773$          4.48% 98,773$          4.45% 98,773$          4.45%
Lease Fees 1,250$            0.06% 1,250$            0.06% 1,250$            0.06% 1,250$            0.06% 1,250$            0.06% 1,250$            0.06%
Repairs and maintenance 4,044$            0.18% 4,044$            0.19% 4,044$            0.18% 4,044$            0.18% 4,044$            0.18% 4,044$            0.18%
MARBIDCO Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 26,271$          1.19% 26,271$          1.19% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Conventional Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 40,955$          1.85% 40,955$          1.85%
Total Fixed Cost 140,697$        6.35% 104,067$        4.78% 130,338$        5.91% 130,338$        5.91% 145,022$        6.53% 145,022$        6.53%
Total Costs 2,215,347$     100.00% 2,178,717$     100.00% 2,204,988$     100.00% 2,204,988$     100.00% 2,219,672$     100.00% 2,219,672$     100.00%







 Personal Funds with 
Nutrient Payments 
 Personal Funds without 
Nutrient Payments 












Table B-6.  Enterprise budget for 1,000,000 oyster per year water-column culture oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Gross Income
 Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 3,779,378$     97.60% 3,779,378$     100.00% 3,779,378$     97.60% 3,779,378$     100.00% 3,779,378$     97.60% 3,779,378$     100.00%
Bushel Oyster Markets -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Total Nutrient Payments 92,895$          2.40% -$               0.00% 92,895$          2.40% -$               0.00% 92,895$          2.40% -$               0.00%





















Seed 340,000$        11.57% 340,000$        11.57% 340,000$        11.44% 340,000$        11.44% 340,000$        11.29% 340,000$        11.37%
Labor -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
General Labor 1,432,885$     48.78% 1,432,885$     48.78% 1,432,885$     48.21% 1,432,885$     48.21% 1,432,885$     47.59% 1,432,885$     47.90%
Supervisory Labor 416,000$        14.16% 416,000$        14.16% 416,000$        14.00% 416,000$        14.00% 416,000$        13.82% 416,000$        13.91%
Worker's Comp 92,444$          3.15% 92,444$          3.15% 92,444$          3.11% 92,444$          3.11% 92,444$          3.07% 92,444$          3.09%
FICA 114,631$        3.90% 114,631$        3.90% 114,631$        3.86% 114,631$        3.86% 114,631$        3.81% 114,631$        3.83%
Unemployment Insurance 48,071$          1.64% 48,071$          1.64% 48,071$          1.62% 48,071$          1.62% 48,071$          1.60% 48,071$          1.61%
Fuel 33,029$          1.12% 33,029$          1.12% 33,029$          1.11% 33,029$          1.11% 33,029$          1.10% 33,029$          1.10%
Monitoring 10,079$          0.34% 10,079$          0.34% 10,079$          0.34% 10,079$          0.34% 10,079$          0.33% 10,079$          0.34%
Retail Containers 78,074$          2.66% 78,074$          2.66% 78,074$          2.63% 78,074$          2.63% 78,074$          2.59% 78,074$          2.61%
Marketing Expenses 31,808$          1.08% 31,808$          1.08% 31,808$          1.07% 31,808$          1.07% 31,808$          1.06% 31,808$          1.06%
Cages Purchased 90,463$          3.08% 90,463$          3.08% 90,463$          3.04% 90,463$          3.04% 90,463$          3.00% 90,463$          3.02%
Mesh Bags Purchased 30,024$          1.02% 30,024$          1.02% 30,024$          1.01% 30,024$          1.01% 30,024$          1.00% 30,024$          1.00%
Overhead 81,525$          2.78% 81,525$          2.78% 81,525$          2.74% 81,525$          2.74% 81,525$          2.71% 81,525$          2.73%





















Insurance 130,470$        4.44% 130,470$        4.44% 130,470$        4.39% 130,470$        4.39% 130,470$        4.33% 130,470$        4.36%
Lease Fees 1,250$            0.04% 1,250$            0.04% 1,250$            0.04% 1,250$            0.04% 1,250$            0.04% 1,250$            0.04%
Repairs and maintenance 6,950$            0.24% 6,950$            0.24% 6,950$            0.23% 6,950$            0.23% 6,950$            0.23% 6,950$            0.23%
MARBIDCO Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 34,516$          1.16% 34,516$          1.16% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Conventional Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 53,469$          1.78% 53,469$          1.79%
Total Fixed Cost 138,670$        4.72% 138,670$        4.72% 173,186$        5.83% 173,186$        5.83% 211,604$        7.03% 192,139$        6.42%
Total Costs 2,937,704$     100.00% 2,937,704$     100.00% 2,972,220$     100.00% 2,972,220$     100.00% 3,010,637$     100.00% 2,991,173$     100.00%
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Table B-7.  Enterprise budget for 2,000,000 oyster per year water-column culture oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay. 
Gross Income
 Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 7,540,957$     97.58% 7,540,957$     100.00% 7,540,957$     97.58% 7,540,957$     100.00% 7,540,957$     97.58% 7,540,957$     100.00%
Bushel Oyster Markets -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Total Nutrient Payments 187,332$        2.42% -$               0.00% 187,332$        2.42% 0.00% 187,332$        2.42% 0.00%





















Seed 680,000$        17.05% 680,000$        17.05% 680,000$        16.88% 680,000$        16.88% 680,000$        16.79% 680,000$        16.79%
Labor -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
General Labor 1,814,101$     45.48% 1,814,101$     45.48% 1,814,101$     45.04% 1,814,101$     45.04% 1,814,101$     44.79% 1,814,101$     44.79%
Supervisory Labor 416,000$        10.43% 416,000$        10.43% 416,000$        10.33% 416,000$        10.33% 416,000$        10.27% 416,000$        10.27%
Worker's Comp 111,505$        2.80% 111,505$        2.80% 111,505$        2.77% 111,505$        2.77% 111,505$        2.75% 111,505$        2.75%
FICA 138,266$        3.47% 138,266$        3.47% 138,266$        3.43% 138,266$        3.43% 138,266$        3.41% 138,266$        3.41%
Unemployment Insurance 57,983$          1.45% 57,983$          1.45% 57,983$          1.44% 57,983$          1.44% 57,983$          1.43% 57,983$          1.43%
Fuel 33,237$          0.83% 33,237$          0.83% 33,237$          0.83% 33,237$          0.83% 33,237$          0.82% 33,237$          0.82%
Monitoring 9,983$            0.25% 9,983$            0.25% 9,983$            0.25% 9,983$            0.25% 9,983$            0.25% 9,983$            0.25%
Retail Containers 156,164$        3.92% 156,164$        3.92% 156,164$        3.88% 156,164$        3.88% 156,164$        3.86% 156,164$        3.86%
Marketing Expenses 31,634$          0.79% 31,634$          0.79% 31,634$          0.79% 31,634$          0.79% 31,634$          0.78% 31,634$          0.78%
Cages Purchased 180,625$        4.53% 180,625$        4.53% 180,625$        4.48% 180,625$        4.48% 180,625$        4.46% 180,625$        4.46%
Mesh Bags Purchased 60,012$          1.50% 60,012$          1.50% 60,012$          1.49% 60,012$          1.49% 60,012$          1.48% 60,012$          1.48%
Overhead 110,685$        2.77% 110,685$        2.77% 110,685$        2.75% 110,685$        2.75% 110,685$        2.73% 110,685$        2.73%





















Insurance 174,608$        4.38% 174,608$        4.38% 174,608$        4.33% 174,608$        4.33% 174,608$        4.31% 174,608$        4.31%
Lease Fees 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03%
Repairs and maintenance 12,623$          0.32% 12,623$          0.32% 12,623$          0.31% 12,623$          0.31% 12,623$          0.31% 12,623$          0.31%
MARBIDCO Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 39,240$          0.97% 39,240$          0.97% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Conventional Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 61,433$          1.52% 61,433$          1.52%
Total Fixed Cost 188,481$        4.73% 188,481$        4.73% 227,722$        5.65% 227,722$        5.65% 249,914$        6.17% 249,914$        6.17%
Total Costs 3,988,676$     100.00% 3,988,676$     100.00% 4,027,916$     100.00% 4,027,916$     100.00% 4,050,108$     100.00% 4,050,108$     100.00%





 Personal Funds with 
Nutrient Payments 
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Nutrient Payments 














Table B-8.  Enterprise budget for 2,500,000 oyster per year water-column culture oyster aquaculture operations in the Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
Gross Income
 Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income  Total $ 
% of 
Income
Half Shell Market Oysters 9,432,650$     97.56% 9,432,650$     100.00% 9,432,650$     97.56% 9,432,650$     100.00% 9,432,650$     97.56% 9,432,650$     100.00%
Bushel Oyster Markets -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Total Nutrient Payments 235,435$        2.44% -$               0.00% 235,435$        2.44% -$               0.00% 235,435$        2.44% -$               0.00%





















Seed 850,000$        19.18% 850,000$        19.18% 850,000$        19.00% 850,000$        19.00% 850,000$        18.90% 850,000$        18.90%
Labor
General Labor 1,936,825$     43.71% 1,936,825$     43.71% 1,936,825$     43.30% 1,936,825$     43.30% 1,936,825$     43.07% 1,936,825$     43.07%
Supervisory Labor 416,000$        9.39% 416,000$        9.39% 416,000$        9.30% 416,000$        9.30% 416,000$        9.25% 416,000$        9.25%
Worker's Comp 117,641$        2.65% 117,641$        2.65% 117,641$        2.63% 117,641$        2.63% 117,641$        2.62% 117,641$        2.62%
FICA 145,875$        3.29% 145,875$        3.29% 145,875$        3.26% 145,875$        3.26% 145,875$        3.24% 145,875$        3.24%
Unemployment Insurance 61,173$          1.38% 61,173$          1.38% 61,173$          1.37% 61,173$          1.37% 61,173$          1.36% 61,173$          1.36%
Fuel 33,458$          0.76% 33,458$          0.76% 33,458$          0.75% 33,458$          0.75% 33,458$          0.74% 33,458$          0.74%
Monitoring 10,035$          0.23% 10,035$          0.23% 10,035$          0.22% 10,035$          0.22% 10,035$          0.22% 10,035$          0.22%
Retail Containers 195,044$        4.40% 195,044$        4.40% 195,044$        4.36% 195,044$        4.36% 195,044$        4.34% 195,044$        4.34%
Marketing Expenses 31,781$          0.72% 31,781$          0.72% 31,781$          0.71% 31,781$          0.71% 31,781$          0.71% 31,781$          0.71%
Cages Purchased 225,673$        5.09% 225,673$        5.09% 225,673$        5.05% 225,673$        5.05% 225,673$        5.02% 225,673$        5.02%
Mesh Bags Purchased 75,024$          1.69% 75,024$          1.69% 75,024$          1.68% 75,024$          1.68% 75,024$          1.67% 75,024$          1.67%
Overhead 122,956$        2.77% 122,956$        2.77% 122,956$        2.75% 122,956$        2.75% 122,956$        2.73% 122,956$        2.73%





















Insurance 193,356$        4.36% 193,356$        4.36% 193,356$        4.32% 193,356$        4.32% 193,356$        4.30% 193,356$        4.30%
Lease Fees 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03% 1,250$            0.03%
Repairs and maintenance 15,440$          0.35% 15,440$          0.35% 15,440$          0.35% 15,440$          0.35% 15,440$          0.34% 15,440$          0.34%
MARBIDCO Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 41,535$          0.93% 41,535$          0.93% -$               0.00% -$               0.00%
Conventional Interest Payments -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% -$               0.00% 65,301$          1.45% 65,301$          1.45%
Total Fixed Cost 210,045$        4.74% 210,045$        4.74% 251,580$        5.62% 251,580$        5.62% 275,346$        6.12% 275,346$        6.12%
Total Costs 4,431,531$     100.00% 4,431,531$     100.00% 4,473,066$     100.00% 4,473,066$     100.00% 4,496,832$     100.00% 4,496,832$     100.00%





 Personal Funds with 
Nutrient Payments 
 Personal Funds without 
Nutrient Payments 
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